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ABSTRACT
DECIDING FOR OTHERS:
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS
Patricia Mary Powell
1987

This paper addresses two questions within contemporary
medical ethics.
First, how do we make treatment decisions for
seriously ill, incompetent patients?
Second, how ought we to
make these decisions?
Most medical ethicists analyze these
questions using the legal model, and therefore strive above all
to protect autonomy and the patient's rights.
This approach
fails to incorporate the concerns of many physicians and family
members, who are concerned not only with rights, but also with
such subjective factors as pain, and the patient's sense of
relation to the community.
Physicians, however, have often been
unable to formulate decisions which are clear and principled, and
yet incorporate this subjective information.
By turning away from the legal model, with its ethics of
rights, and toward the ethics of responsibility, we can derive
principles which will aid physicians and families in making
decisions for incompetent patients.
This new ethical framework
allows us to describe more accurately the relevant factors in
decisions for incompetent patients. In addition, the ethics of
responsibility shows us how to improve decisions in this crucial
area of medical ethics.
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Chapter I:

Introduction

This thesis will attempt to shed light on two difficult
questions within medical ethics.
decisions for seriously ill,

First,

how do we make treatment

incompetent patients?

Second,

how

ought we to make these decisions?
I do not pretend to ask these questions in an entirely
neutral manner,
observations.

for they are prompted by certain troubling
Physicians and members of the public criticize the

legal reasoning used in analyzing these decisions as being poorly
suited to the task.

The adversarial nature of legal proceedings,

as well as the very neutrality and objectivity for which the law
strives,

fail to address the often subjective and emotional

factors which may be pivotal in these dilemmas.
Physicians, who may sense keenly the short-comings of the
legal model,

are themselves unable to articulate clearly more

appropriate principles for making these decisions.
with the pain of patients and their families,

Confronted

and yet taxed by

their perceived duty to pursue a cure with ever slimmer hopes of
success,

physicians flounder,

obligations.

failing to reconcile conflicting

Thus we witness what doctors and lawyers have both

identified as a persistent inability among physicians to name the
principles by which they arrive at treatment decisions for
incompetent patients.
Medical ethics ought to be a source of help to the

2

physician,

by articulating and defining principles for decision¬

making. However,

ethics often falls short of this goal.

The main

voice in the literature of medical ethics today emphasizes unduly
the language and concepts of the law.

The principles most

frequently upheld in guiding decisions for all patients,
including incompetent ones,
and patients’

rights.

are directed at preserving autonomy

Such concepts are cruelly inappropriate

when applied to patients like Karen Quinlan, who are wholly
unable to exercise autonomy or to assert any right.
without a trace of irony,

And yet

the removal of a respirator from Karen

Quinlan is described by one eminent ethicist as a "triumph of
autonomy."

There is a disquieting gap between the way many

ethicists describe decision-making for incompetent patients,
how it is experienced by physicians and family members.
surprisingly,

and

Not

the answers supplied by the ethicist seem often not

to match the questions asked by families and doctors.
Is there any way to improve the fashion in which these
decisions are formed?

I believe there is,

by turning away from

the legal model, with its emphasis on rights,
confrontation.

The point is not,

however,

autonomy,

and

for doctors to

chastise lawyers for the adverse impact of law on medicine,

nor

to suggest that these decisions are made excellently when doctors
are left on their own.

Indeed,

the case which we shall examine

most closely and criticize most harshly,

that of John Storar,

one in which the courts sided with the physicians,
disadvantage of the patient.

In fact,

to the

doctors too often assign

was
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elsewhere the blame for medicine's inadequacies.

It is we who

must strive to articulate our responsibilities in a way that
incorporates the kindness and humanity that exemplifies medicine
at its best, while delineating principles which are clear,
accessible to public discussion.

If we cannot do this,

and

it is

with ourselves we must find fault.
Such principles,

at once kind yet clear,

can be subsumed

within the ethics of responsibility, which contrasts with the
legal system's ethics of rights.
responsibility,

In describing the ethics of

I hope to provide a view of medical decision¬

making that is more accurate than the legal description,

in that

it acknowledges the impact of such subjective factors as emotion
and pain.

But beyond this sharper picture of reality,

I hope

also to indicate the direction we may take in striving for an
ideal.

That ideal cannot be realized, however,

unless physicians

accept responsibility for promoting among themselves clear
thinking on these painful issues.

In addition, we must help the

public understand more fully the limitations of medicine at the
end of life,

and the distinction between decisions which are

purely technical,

and those which require ethical and moral

evaluation.

The Plan of the Thesis
In order to answer our two questions about decision-making
for incompetent patients, we

will proceed according to the

4

following plan.

In Chapter II, we will set the questions in

their historical context by briefly reviewing major forces that
have shaped medical ethics.

In particular, we will look at the

emergence of autonomy as a central concept in reasoning about
medical dilemmas.

In chapter III, we will examine some of the

flaws of this standard approach,
incompetent patients.

Then,

especially as it applies to

in chapters IV and V, we will

examine the work of two psychologists,
Carol Gilligan,

Lawrence Kohlberg and

and apply some of their insights about moral

development to the context of medical ethics.
The Ethics of Responsibility,

the subject of chapter VI,

is

an effort to formulate a new ethical model, which will respond to
criticisms of the old model and incorporate concepts not
expressed within the traditional framework.
chapter VII,

We then discuss,

in

a particular legal case involving the withdrawal of

life-sustaining treatment in an incompetent patient.
investigate how the court decided,

We

and how one might have

improved the outcome by reasoning within the ethics of
responsibility.

Chapter VIII summarizes conclusions and

recommendations.
Before we begin our investigation,

let us provide a few

ground rules about the use of language in medical ethics.

There

are a few words that persistently arise in discussions such as
the one we are about to undertake.

Examples include words like

"terminal," "heroic," and "extraordinary."

Unfortunately,

definitions of these words vary from author to author, making

5

their interpretation impossible.
definitions for this paper,
recent writers,
as possible.

Rather than provide a set of

I have followed the example of some

and have attempted to avoid these terms as much
In some instances, this effort has meant the

addition of explanatory phrases in place of one of these illdefined words.

I ask the reader to bear with me in this effort to

attain greater clarity.

6

Chapter II:

The Historical Context

The problem of making treatment decisions

for incompetent

patients has attracted an extraordinary amount of attention in
the last decade.

No doubt the reason lies

in part in the great

number of life-sustaining and life-saving treatments which are
newly available.

Fifty years ago,

physicians and families chose

among relatively few possible interventions
patients.

Since that time,

for seriously ill

intensive care units,

respirators,

defibrillators,

and a rapidly expanding array of antibiotics and

ingenious means

for delivering nutrition have become commonplace.

One reason that the problem has become more acute,

therefore,

is

that there are more interventions to argue about.
However,

the impact of new technology cannot fully explain

why the debate stirs such passion.
always been proposed,
heatedly,

New medical treatments have

and physicians have always,

more or less

debated the merits of new and old regimens.

Certainly

this was true in 1871 when George Eliot wrote Middlemarch.

in

which the ambitious young Doctor Lydgate provokes the ire of his
peers with such radical

innovations as the stethoscope.1

Thus,

it is not just new technology that makes this problem
contemporary.

In any era physicians and families could have

publicly debated the merits of continuing or withdrawing

1
Books,

George Eliot, Middlemarch.
1985, (1871), p.371.

Middlesex,

England,

Penguin
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therapies,

yet they did not.

What has changed,

then,

is that

doctors and families do in fact debate these decisions,

and in an

unprecedentedly acrimonious and public fashion.
When one person is granted sole and unquestioned power to
make a decision,
that decision.

there is little room for public debate about
Historically,

doctors

felt that such exclusive

decision-making power was not only their prerogative,
obligation.

but their

This belief reflects an ancient tradition within

medical ethics which emphasizes a benevolent protectiveness of
doctors toward their patients.
In the Hippocratic Oath doctors swear to protect patients
from harm and injustice,
as defined by the doctor.

and to work for the benefit of the sick,
No reference is made to the

possibility of a disagreement between doctor and patient as to
what constitutes the patient's best interest.

The Hippocratic

Oath springs entirely from the doctor's point of view.
only does not admit the possibility of argument,
existence of the patient's opinion.
tradition,

doctors are active,

are subjects,

Thus,

ignores the

within the Hippocratic

and patients are passive;

while patients are objects.

treated with the utmost care,

it

It not

doctors

They are objects to be

but objects nonetheless.

This benevolent arrogance was perpetuated in more recent
medical codes of ethics.
published in 1803,

Thomas Percival's Medical Ethics.

reaffirmed the physician's obligations of

beneficence and nonmaleficence,
the patient's

without discussing the idea of

independent point of view.

For instance,

Percival

8
concurred with the practice of not revealing to patients their
unfavorable prognoses unless "absolutely necessary."

Doctors

were to decide what information patients ought to know.
when it adopted its first code in 1847,
Percival's statements,

The AMA,

drew largely from

although adding a few phrases designed to

underscore the physician's authority.2
This tradition was biased toward the doctor's viewpoint and
allowed physicians unfettered authority in exchange
benevolent supervision.

It was bound to run afoul of modern

legal notions of individual
Thus,

for

liberty and self-determination.

the law entered the realm of medical ethics,

and became a

new shaping force.
Although earlier examples exist,
the legal

two celebrated instances of

influence on medical ethics occurred in this country in

the early twentieth century.

In 1905,

suffering from chronic epilepsy,
authority on the subject.

Dr.

Mrs.

Parmelia Davis,

was referred to Dr.

an

Pratt determined that a total

hysterectomy was the treatment of choice for Mrs.
epilepsy,

Pratt,

Davis'

and then performed the operation without ever

explaining its nature to Mrs.

Davis.

uterus and ovaries had been removed,
treatment was

inappropriate,

When she learned that her
she sued,

not because the

but because she had not been warned.

The doctor explained that he had not informed her because he

2
Both Percival's Medical Ethics and the AMA code are
discussed in: Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient.
New York, Macmillan, Inc., 1984, p.17.
Katz provides an
excellent analysis not only of the evolution of codes of medical
ethics, but also of informed consent.

9
"wished her to come to the operating room without violence."
doctor claimed that by consenting to treatment,

The

the patient

implicitly gave her consent to any procedure the physician deemed
necessary.

The court disagreed.

Indeed,

the judge found that to

operate without permission was a violation of the patient's
bodily integrity3.
The case of Schloendorff v.
Hospital,

in 1914,

The Society of New York

concerned another instance of an operation

performed without permission.

In this case,

Mrs.

Schloendorff

had agreed to a pelvic examination under anesthesia,
insisting that no operation should take place.
previously stated wishes,

while

Despite her

the physician proceeded to remove a

fibroid tumor from the uterus.
produced the famous statement:

In his decision,

Justice Cardozo

"Every human being of adult years

and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body..."4

This decision provided a springboard that

helped clearly establish in common law the competent patient's
right to refuse treatment.
Such judgments established more than a single right;

they

changed the vocabulary of medical ethics.

The new language of

medical ethics became the language of law,

i.e.,

rights.

The change was more than just semantic,

the language of
however,

for it

marked the entrance of law as a new force in medical ethics.
also introduced a profound tension between two viewpoints

3
4

Pratt v.

Davis,

Schloendorff v.

118

Ill.

App.161

New York Hospital,

in

(1905).
211 N.Y.

125

(1914).

It
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medical ethics.

One,

older and more intrinsically medical,

reflects the Hippocratic tradition of benevolent despotism.
second,

a newer legal viewpoint,

The

emphasizes the rights of

individuals.

Autonomy's Rise
The legal emphasis on individual rights grew out of the
political philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
In particular,

the philosophy of Immanuel Kant influences the

notion of individual rights in contemporary medical ethics.
based his ethical system on the categorical

imperative,

known as the principle of respect for persons.
this principle is as follows:
own person as well as

never merely as a means."5

always as an end,

is autonomous.

derived from the Greek autos

(self)

constrained by factors such as fear or appetite6.
own desires and emotions are seen as external

far as

Thus

and nomos

is exhibited by one who formulates his own moral

will,

in your

Persons deserve respect in so

they are rational beings whose will
autonomy,

also

One version of

"Act so as to treat man,

in that of anyone else,

Kant

laws,

(rule),
and is not

A person's

influences on the

which is defined by Kant as a purely rational capacity.

Autonomy,

based entirely in reason,

respect for persons.

is for Kant the basis of

All other rights and privileges stem from

5
Immanuel Kant, "Metaphysical Foundations of Morals,"
The Philosophy of Kant, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich, New York,
Modern Library, 1949, (1785), p.178.
6

Ibid..

p.187.

in
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this central concept of autonomy.
A different view of autonomy emerges
writings
action,

in the nineteenth century.

from John Stuart Mill's

Mill stresses

rather than of the will alone.

freedom of

He insists that

autonomous persons must be free to choose courses of action which
may run counter to societal conventions,
are not harmed.
community,

In defining the relation of

Mill

rightly compel

as long as other persons
individuals to the

is concerned primarily with what society may
individuals to do.

obligations to society thus:
rights of others,

and 2)

1)

He summarizes the individual's

to act so as not to injure the

to bear a share of the labor necessary

to defend society from injury and molestation.7
emphasizes negative freedoms;

Thus,

Mill

autonomy becomes the right to be

let alone.
For the purposes of this essay,

we will define autonomy as

the freedom of the individual to act on his moral beliefs without
the physical or psychological constraints of others8.
modern definition of autonomy,
Childress,
rational

differs

factors

This

based on that of Beauchamp and

from Kant's in that it allows a role for non-

in autonomous choice.

The statement is phrased

so that actions influenced by emotion could be considered
autonomous.

7
Books,

Beauchamp and Childress define as external only that

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty.
1976, (1859), pp.141-2.

Middlesex,

England,

Penguin

8
Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of
Biomedical Ethics. New
York, Oxford University Press, 1983,

P-59.
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which comes from other persons, whereas Kant defines as external
those forces within the person which are not wholly rational.
According to all these definitions, however,
basis of respect for persons,

autonomy is the

and for the rights which are

contingent upon this respect.
Autonomy has played a crucial role in the development of
medical ethics in the twentieth century,
but for research subjects as well.

not just for patients,

The importance of autonomy

was quite evident from the codes of medical ethics which emerged
from the trial of Nazi doctors at Nuremberg.
experiments conducted on prisoners,

Shocked by

physicians and others were

driven to elucidate the necessary ethical conditions for research
on human subjects.

The first of the basic principles enumerated

was that "the voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential."9

The code then stipulates that consent is

not voluntary unless the person may "exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force,
deceit,

duress,

overreaching,

constraint or coercion...."10

fraud,

or other ulterior form of
In addition,

consent must be based

on knowledge of the experiment's nature and purpose,

and any

hazards it might entail for the subject.
It is of historical interest to note that the Nuremberg
Code was not the first attempt to formulate ethical guidelines

9
p.339.
10

Nuremberg Code,

Ibid.

1949,

quoted in Beauchamp and Childress,

■
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for human experimentation.

Indeed,

legally binding standards

were in effect in Germany during the Third Reich.
specifically require informed consent
and "Human Experimentation."

These rules

for both "New Therapy"

Although informed consent might be

waived for new therapy "in urgent cases," no such exceptions
existed for non-therapeutic experimentation.
consent,

Thus,

"without

non-therapeutic research [was] under no circumstances

permissible.1,11

Although the Nuremberg Code focussed public

attention on the need to clarify and enforce codes of medical
ethics,

it was not,

although it is often described as,

the first

attempt to accomplish this task.
The World Medical Assembly revised and expanded the concepts
of the Nuremberg Code,

adopting new guidelines in 1964.

The new

code continued to stress the importance of autonomy and thus of
informed consent.

Specific injunctions were included that

potential subjects be:
adequately informed of the aims, methods, anticipated
benefits and potential hazards of the study and the
discomfort it may entail.
He or she should be informed that
he or she is at liberty to abstain from participation in the
study...[or] withdraw...consent to participation at any
time.12
This statement, which became known as the Declaration of
Helsinki,

further clarified the rights of research subjects,

11
Hans-Martin Sass, "Reichsrundschreiben 1931: PreNuremberg German Regulations Concerning New Therapy and Human
Experimentation", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 8 (1983),
p.106.
12
Declaration of Helsinki,
Beauchamp and Childress, p.343.

1964,

quoted in Appendix II,

V.
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which derive from the principle of autonomy.
The Declaration of Helsinki served not only to define the
rights of research subjects,
became possible,

but to draw attention to them.

with guideline in hand,

It

to examine experiments

and decide whether or not they in fact complied with the stated
ethical principles.

Not surprisingly,

various experiments were

found wanting in this regard.
Among the most controversial of these experiments was the
Tuskegee syphilis study.
auspices of the U.S.

This study commenced in 1932 under the

Public Health Service,

and was not

terminated until

1972.

County,

were enrolled in an experiment to observe the

Alabama,

Some 400 black male residents of Macon

course of untreated syphilis.

Physicians at the time knew the

grave consequences of untreated syphilis,

and believed that an

effective treatment existed in arsenic therapy.

The subjects

were not warned that effective therapy existed,

and that their

participation in the experiment therefore posed an unnecessary
risk to them.

Thus,

they were not informed of the treatment

options either at the start of the study,

or in the

1950's,

when

penicillin proved to be both unmistakably effective and widely
available.
Indeed,

the subjects were not even informed that they were

in an experiment.

They believed that they were being treated

without charge by government doctors.
not charged,

It is true that they were

but neither were they treated.

In fact,

the

researchers circulated a list of names of participants to local

15
health facilities and to the Army,
served,

in which some of the subjects

and requested that these men not be treated for syphilis

because of their participation in the study.
Nor was the Tuskegee study a brief aberration.

Although its

findings had been reported in the scientific literature
sporadically over the years,

the study was not widely known until

word of it appeared in the national press
convened a panel,

in 1972.

HEW then

but by the time this group issued its

condemning Final Report a year later,

between 30 and 100 men were

estimated to have died directly as a result of advanced
syphilis.13
The Tuskegee study,

rife with racism,

deceit,

and the

decades-long abuse of a disadvantaged rural population stands as
an unusually chilling example of how wrong physicians could be in
their treatment of research subjects.

These doctors honored

neither the Hippocratic tradition of nonmaleficence,
rights-based tradition of informed consent.
in the 1930's,

nor the

Although conceived

one cannot lay the blame entirely on the

thoughtlessness of an earlier generation,

for the study was

reviewed and continually funded by the Public Health Service
throughout its

forty year history.

The public outcry following

the press's exposure of the study indicated that such practices
would not be tolerated.

13
Allan Brandt, "Racism and Research:
The Case of the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study," The Hastings Center Report. December,
1978, pp.21-9.
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Thus,

by the early 1970's there emerged a clear conception

of the rights of research subjects as autonomous persons
deserving of respect.
parallel

lines,

consent14.

The rights of patients developed along

particularly stressing the right to informed

In 1973,

the American Hospital Association summarized

these developments in the Patient's Bill of Rights.

The Bill

lists and describes such rights as that to "respectful care,"
informed consent,

and confidentiality.

concluding paragraph,

Interestingly,

the Bill states that,

in its

"No catalog of rights

can guarantee for the patient the kind of treatment he has a
right to expect."

Therefore,

the hospital must structure all

activities

in order to ensure "above all,

patient's]

dignity as a human being.

the recognition of

Success

its
[the

in achieving this

recognition assures success in the defense of the rights of the
patient."15

Standards

for Decision-Making

It is against this historical background that the standards
of decision-making for incompetent patients developed,
still evolving.

We will review them as they now exist.

Competent patients,
have the right,

14

II,

and are

i.e.,

those of "adult years and sound mind"

clearly established in common law,

see Jay Katz,

Silent World,

to refuse any

especially chapter 3.

15
American Hospital Association,
Beauchamp and Childress, p.338.

1973,

quoted in Appendix

17
treatment16.
When we are confronted with a once-competent patient,

we

must search for previous expressions about what treatments he
thought appropriate in the event of becoming incompetent.
Rarely,

we discover a patient who has left a detailed account of

these views,

and then we use the substitute judgment standard.

Brother Fox is an example of such a patient.

In the context of a

formal discussion in his religious community,

83

Fox stated,

that he would not

in reference to the Quinlan case,

want "heroic" measures,

year old Brother

such as artificial respiration,

were irreversibly comatose.

if he

He repeated these views to his

superior before entering the hospital

for a herniorrhaphy.

Brother Fox suffered complications of general anesthesia,
went into a coma17.

The court appropriately used the substitute

judgment standard and removed the respirator.
thus,

and

is correctly used for patients who,

This standard,

when competent,

expressed clear views on treatments they would find acceptable
when incompetent.
Proxy decisions,

i.e.,

decisions for the incompetent,

more difficult for patients who were never competent,
never stated views on life-sustaining treatment.
the President's Commission,

266;

Schloendorff;

see ref.

17
Matter of Eichner,
March, 1981.

or who

According to

we ought not to use the substitute

judgment standard for such patients,

16

are

since we are not in a

4.

on behalf of Fox,

438 NYS

2nd Series,

18
position to know what they would do if competent.

We must

instead use the best interest standard18.
The best interest standard is defined,
President's Commission,

according to the

"by reference to more objective,

societally shared criteria...[It]

does not rest on self-

determination but solely on protection of patient's welfare."19
This standard does not set out to maximize autonomy,
protection.

The Commission goes on,

however,

but

to add that the

surrogate decision-maker should "...choose a course that will
promote the patient's well-being as

it would probably be

conceived by a reasonable person in the patient's
circumstances... ."20
The best interest standard,
criteria,"

as

due to its use of

"objective

"conceived by a reasonable person," has not always

been adequate to its task.

In the Saikewicz

case,

for instance,

the judge considered and rejected the best interest standard.
Joseph Saikewicz was a 67 year old,

severely retarded,

non-verbal

and permanently institutionalized man who bore the diagnosis of
acute myeloblastic monocytic leukemia.
chemotherapy,

If Saikewicz

received

he would have about a forty percent chance of a

18
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to
Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment. Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983, p.134.
19

Ibid..

p.135.

20

Ibid..

p.136.

19
remission,

which might last from two to thirteen months21.

Most patients with this form of leukemia do elect chemotherapy.
The judge felt that the most common decision,
people,

must be the "reasonable"

people were not like Saikewicz;
for their painful treatment,

one.

that made by most

Yet he realized that other

they could understand the reason

whereas he could not.

they were not truly "in his circumstances."

Therefore,

The judge was

extremely reluctant to impose on Saikewicz a painful therapy for
which he could understand neither the nature nor the purpose.
On a practical

level,

it would be hard to administer the

treatment without Saikewicz's cooperation.

Furthermore,

the

judge wished to preserve for Saikewicz the possibility of
refusal,

which each one of these competent patients had.

Thus,

the judge tried to incorporate into his decision subjective
factors which he rightfully considered to be central.

The only

method he could devise was to reject the unyieldingly objective
best interest standard and adapt the substitute judgment
standard,

although Saikewicz had never been competent.

The judge

asks us to indulge in the fiction that Saikewicz could for an
instant be competent,

yet realize that he would soon,

be permanently incompetent.

once again,

He theorizes that Saikewicz would

then choose to forego chemotherapy.

This bizarre approach

attempts to correct the flaws of the best interest standard by
including important subjective factors

21
Matter of Saikewicz,
Court, November, 1977.

in a decision for a never-

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

20
competent patient.
The Saikewicz decision was written several years before the
President's Commission's recommendations on the use of the
substitute judgment and best interest standards.

If the Supreme

Court of Massachusetts were deciding the case today,
know that substitute judgment was

"wrong"

they would

for Saikewicz,

but they

might still be dissatisfied with the best interest standard.
Neither standard accommodates the need to include subjective
factors when deciding for never competent patients.

Thus,

standards are inadequate.

therefore,

We shall need to develop,

within the ethics of responsibility,

the

standards which will

accommodate subjective criteria in decisions

for the never-

competent.
The legal

standards make the assumption that when a patient

cannot competently tell us of his subjective experiences,
cannot know them,
making.

we

and so must disregard them in our decision¬

Yet even persons with severely compromised competence

do have subjective experiences,
an extent.

For instance,

and these can be known by us to

when Mary Hier,

a ninety-two year old,

chronically demented patient persistently removed her gastrostomy
feeding tube,
her.

she was indicating that the tube was painful to

The Massachusetts court placed considerable credence

these communications,

although they were those of an

incompetent22.

the court decided not to

Thus,

force Mrs.

undergo surgery for the reimplantation of her tube,

22
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she would then lack any route by which to receive life-sustaining
nutrition.
If we were to ignore subjective factors,

we would be

categorically denying information which ought to figure heavily
in our decisions.

For it is in this realm of the subjective in

which suffering occurs,
excluded from suffering.

and the incompetent are in no way
Eric Cassell has commented on the need

to improve our understanding of suffering:
Attempting to understand what suffering is and how
physicians might truly be devoted to its relief will require
that medicine and its critics overcome the dichotomy between
mind and body and the associated dichotomies between
subjective and objective and between person and object.23
The acknowledgment of suffering is crucial
within the ethics of responsibility;

for medical decisions

such knowledge requires that

we strive to understand the communications of the incompetent.
Thus,

we have briefly examined some of the forces which

shape contemporary medical ethics.

The Hippocratic Oath stressed

the beneficence of autonomous physicians caring for dependent
patients.

Many have come to see this as a paternalistic

attitude.

In addition,

patients have discovered that doctors are

fallible in their assessments of what constitutes the patient's
best interest.

Thus,

patients have demanded a greater degree of

control over their medical care.

In addition,

more recent

ethical codes have urged us to acknowledge that both research
subjects and patients are autonomous persons deserving of

23
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respect.

Autonomy has emerged as the dominant principle in

contemporary medical ethics.
various groups,
respect,

It has grown in importance as

patients among them,

have learned to insist on

and on the rights which they feel are their due,

self-

rule being chief among them.
In an historical context,

it becomes easier to comprehend

why medical ethicists today rely heavily on autonomy in their
analyses.

This concept has been the means by which patients and

research subjects have asserted their dignity as persons able to
make choices.

But while the notion of autonomy has played a

central role in the evolution of medical ethics,
role has been in large part positive,
autonomy will prove useful

there is no guarantee that

in solving all questions

comtemporary medical ethics.
chapter,

and while this

in

As we shall see in the following

difficulties arise when we rely too greatly on autonomy

in our dissection of medical dilemmas,
incompetent patients.

especially those involving

■
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Chapter III:

Autonomy Questioned

Autonomy played an invaluable role in the development of
medical ethics
however,

in the last few decades.

Its preeminence,

has recently come under scrutiny,

been its most ardent supporters.

First,

even by those who have

not all definitions of

autonomy are suitable for medical ethics.

For one thing,

autonomy in its most exaggerated form would leave patients
unpleasantly isolated.

Witness,

for instance,

Sartre's account

of the conditions necessary for autonomy:
Man can will nothing unless he has first understood that he
must count on no one but himself; that he is alone,
abandoned on earth in the midst of his infinite
responsibilities, without help, with no other aim than the
one he sets himself, with no other destiny than the one he
forges for himself on this earth.24
Ethics would have won a strange victory indeed if it battled
paternalism so that patients might feel
help."

"abandoned"

and "without

Sartre's definition is not what medical ethicists would

describe as their goal
However,

for patients.

extreme ideas of autonomy,

not unlike Sartre's,

filter into discussions of medical ethics.

can

Daniel Callahan has

pointed out a number of distorted and exaggerated notions of
autonomy which he finds not in the philosophical
in common parlance,

"in the streets."

literature but

Callahan believes that

these popular misuses can reveal weaknesses

in a concept as

24
Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness.
Barnes, New York, Washington Square Press, 1943.

Trans,
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transferred from the abstract into the real world.

One such

distortion of autonomy is the notion that "respect for the
autonomy of others is sufficient ground for overriding my own
conscience."25

Like Sartre's definition,

this version of

autonomy would have damaging repercussions

if acted upon by

physicians.
But Callahan finds more that is disturbing about autonomy
than that it can be abused.
ethics,
conduct.

It is the lynch pin of medical

yet it tells us nothing about many aspects of ethical
For instance,

autonomy cannot tell us how we are to

conduct ourselves within a moral community.

Bland

recommendations not to interfere with the autonomy of other
persons do not tell us how we are to respond to a call
from a drowning man.

Thus,

for help

Callahan fears that to put autonomy

before all other values,
buys our freedom at too high a price.
It establishes
contractual relationships as the principal and highest form
of relationships. It elevates isolation and separation as
the necessary starting point of human commitments. It
presumes that the moral life can be made a wholly voluntary
matter..., thus attempting to deny the validity of many
uninvited moral obligations that ordinary life with other
people usually casts before us.26
Thus autonomy,

even in its purest form,

to ethical behavior.

cannot be the sole guide

We must look further if we are to discern a

basis for life with other people.
Callahan is not the only writer who has been a staunch

25
Daniel Callahan, "Autonomy:
A Moral Good, Not a Moral
Obsession," Hastings Center Report. October, 1984, p.41.
26
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defender of autonomy,

and yet who now feels that its location at

the pinnacle of medical ethics must be re-examined.

In

"Autonomy's Temporary Triumph," Robert Veatch examines the
ascendance of autonomy in its historical context.

He believes

that autonomy was necessarily granted paramount importance in
order to create a "principle that responded to an extreme
paternalism."27
practice,

Paternalism

may not be gone without a trace in

according to Veatch,

but it has effectively been

banished as a concept worthy of respect in the literature of
medical ethics.

Thus,

Veatch feels that we may now turn our

attention to tasks that lie ahead.
Like Callahan,

Veatch finds wanting in autonomy a guide

relations in a community of ethical persons.

Thus,

for

he writes:

That autonomy trumped Hippocratic paternalism said nothing
about the relation of autonomy to our duty to others to
organize a community in a moral way.
Thus, the goal has
become one of recovering our sense of a moral
community....28
What Veatch tells us therefore,

is that autonomy was a worthy

first step in the construction of a more complete system of
ethics.

Autonomy guides relations between individual patients

and doctors,

but what is needed now is to graft onto this

structure principles which will help us

in larger social

situations.
Veatch wants to go beyond the individual,

who is both

27
Robert M. Veatch, "Autonomy's Temporary Triumph,"
Hastings Center Report. October, 1984, p.38.
28
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guided and protected by autonomy, to include the community in an
"ethic of justice."

Autonomy will gradually take its rightful

place among a host of values in this ethic of the future,

and

indeed will regain the lustre it has today only in those "rare
cases"

which concern an "isolated patient exercising his or her

will unbounded by obligations to others."29
Interestingly, Veatch never pauses to define the moral
community he hopes to build.

He does make passing reference to

"an ethic of justice" which "affirms the equal status of
individuals."30

He does not mention any obligations felt by one

equal individual toward another,

nor does he discuss special

protections for vulnerable persons.

Although it is unfair to

criticize Veatch1s definition of community when he has not
clearly presented it,

the implication is that persons remain

equal yet isolated when a community is founded upon autonomy.
As Veatch reflects upon autonomy's ascendance,

and its now

possible re-evaluation, he makes reference to that case which he
feels most contributed to "autonomy's temporary triumph."
Curiously enough, he cites the now famous case of Karen Quinlan,
a young girl who lapsed into an irreversible coma.

Karen's

breathing was controlled by an artificial respirator, without
which it was believed she would not survive. Her parents fought,
against medical advice,

to have this device removed.

protracted legal battles,

29 Ibid.,
30

Ibid.

p.40.

After

Karen's father won the right to have
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her respirator removed,
(Ironically,

so that she might be allowed to die.

Miss Quinlan survived ten years after artificial

respiration was discontinued.)
Veatch's discussion of Quinlan reveals a curious
inconsistency.

He tells us

first that it is Quinlan whose case

"established firmly and finally that there are limits on the
physician's authority to do what he or she thinks will benefit
the patient."31

While it is true that such limits were clarified

by the Quinlan decision,

I cannot share with

Veatch the

conclusion that Quinlan therefore offers proof that
trumped Hippocratic paternalism."
dealt a blow,

and rightly so,

"autonomy

Although paternalism has been

it is not at all clear that

autonomy is the victor.
Since autonomy had proved fruitful

in the struggle of

research subjects and competent patients who desired respect,

it

is not surprising that Veatch would turn to this concept to solve
Quinlan's dilemma.

In this case,

however,

autonomy does not show

us the path to respect.
I would not describe the legacy of Quinlan as the triumph
of autonomy.

Quinlan meant the end of a certain sort of autonomy

for physicians,
arrogance.

Thus,

an autonomy which sometimes amounted to
paternalism was

indeed trumped.

However,

the

decision does not represent a victory for patient autonomy,
no patient could be less autonomous than Karen Quinlan.
The emphasis on autonomy seems cruelly misplaced as we

31

Ibid.,

p.39.

for

.

28
consider the plight of this wholly dependent young woman.

There

must be some other principle or quality we may call upon in order
to demonstrate respect for a patient like Quinlan.

We might

invoke the "right to die," or alternatively the "right to life,"
but both these rights seem somehow hollow without an autonomous
individual to claim one and forego the other.

Karen's father

believed that he was most qualified to determine both what was
best for her,

and what she would want.

of parents to make decisions

Thus,

he invokes the right

for their dependent children.

And

yet that right is curtailed by the doctrine of parens patriae —
the duty of the state to protect vulnerable persons,
children whose parents may make harmful decisions
We might invoke a number of other rights,
is flawed in precisely the same way;
away from where it belongs,
patient,

who is

including

for them.

but each

they seem to draw attention

on Karen Quinlan,

the dependent

incapable of exercising any right.

It is possible to describe the dilemma of Quinlan in a way
that does not focus on autonomy or on any other right.
view the situation as one involving various persons,
in good faith,

We may

each acting

and each attempting to express a different idea of

what will benefit Karen.

Karen is also an actor in a sense,

that her presence forms a cry for help.

in

Her plight demands that

we act upon those responsibilities we feel as members of a moral
community.
Karen's

family acts within the relationship of love;

want an end to her suffering.

Her physicians,

we assume,

they
act

'
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upon their sense of professional duty.
abandon their patient;
possible for her.

They do not want to

they would like to do everything medically

This conflict is not essentially one of

autonomy versus paternalism;

it is between various persons who

feel an obligation to help someone who is dependent upon them,

a

theme we will develop in subsequent chapters.
Thus,

I disagree with Veatch,

our first principle

who says autonomy should be

in cases like that of Quinlan,

and that we

must add lesser principles to it as we include the concerns of
the community.

I believe that we should be able to devise one

set of principles which show us how to respect both autonomous
and non-autonomous patients.

As

it is,

we have a system which

tells us nothing about how autonomous persons behave within
communities.

Even worse,

this emphasis on autonomy seems to deny

the very existence of an incompetent patient like Quinlan.

We

cannot simultaneously respect the patient and ignore the
conditions of her existence.

The failure of autonomy is upon us,

for we are already in our community,
autonomous and dependent persons,
to guide us.

which is comprised of both

and sorely in need of an ethics

■
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Chapter IV:

Theories of Moral Development

Kohlberg's Stages
Often,

studies

from another discipline may shed light on

one’s own endeavors.

In the present case,

psychological

studies

of moral development may help us in our examination of medical
ethics.

Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg has described moral

development as striving toward an ethics of rights.
legal

system,

he places autonomy,

other principles.
former student,

guided by reason,

As

in the

before all

His work has been usefully criticized by his

Carol Gilligan.

The flaws she finds

in

Kohlberg's system will direct us as we examine medical ethics
with its current emphasis on autonomy.
Kohlberg greatly advanced the study of moral development.
He believed that development occurs by way of a set of
irreversible and invariant stages.
capacities mature,
reasoning.

Thus,

As children's cognitive

so too do their capacities

for moral

Kohlberg felt that moral reasoning did not

merely change with age,

but improved.

Further,

these

improvements were linked to a child's ability to grasp a set of
hierarchical moral principles,

beginning with the most primitive

and working up to the most sophisticated.

Thus,

reasoned at level two of Kohlberg's six stages,

if a child
he would almost

certainly not be able to understand reasoning at level
six.

The reverse,

however,

would not be true;

five or

children

31
reasoning at level

five would have passed through level two and

would thus be able to comprehend its underlying principles.
Kohlberg believed that these principles were universal to
all cultures and all eras.
of adults

Although he found that the majority

in some cultures reasoned at a "lower"

of other cultures,

level than those

he attributed this difference not to a bias in

the theory nor to inherent inferiority of the less advanced
cultures,

but to a poverty of environment that left those groups

unexposed to more advanced forms of moral reasoning.

Those

cultures which seemed to lag behind by Kohlberg's measures tended
to be rural and non-Western.32
Kohlberg's basic method was simple yet elegant.

He

presented the volunteer with a hypothetical moral dilemma.
person was asked how he would solve the problem,
Heinz dilemma was the one most frequently used.
Heinz's wife suffers from a deadly disease.
can save her life,
thousand dollars
such a sum.

in cash.

Heinz

A drug exists which

These reasons,

of this work;

should do,

and

and the moral maturity they

in the Kohlberg system.

A detailed examination of Kohlberg's stages
scope

it for two

is a poor man with no access to

The volunteer must decide what Heinz

determine one's level

The

In this story,

but the druggist will only sell

explain the reasons.
reflect,

and why.

This

is beyond the

we will describe the stages briefly,

and

comment on those principles which are relevant.

32
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Kohlberg's theory posits three levels which are broken up
into six stages.
advanced,

The preconventional level

is the least

and contains stages one and two.

Persons who operate

at level one are concerned with obeying rules in order to avoid
punishment.

At level two,

persons act to further their own self-

interest.
The next level up in Kohlberg's hierarchy is
conventional

level.

Persons at stage three,

interpersonal expectations,"
relationships,
gratitude."

the

"the stage of mutual

are concerned with "keeping mutual

maintaining trust,

loyalty,

respect,

and

Motivation centers on the need to be perceived as

good in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others.33
also within the conventional

level,

Stage four,

is characterized by the

desire to fulfill obligations to which one has agreed,
that society and its

institutions may be maintained;

in order

this stage

has been dubbed the "law and order mentality."
The postconventional

level begins with stage five,

the right is upholding the basic values of a group,
those values conflict with actual laws of the group.

in which

even when
One upholds

these values because of a felt obligation to protect one's own
rights and those of others.
"Family,

friendship,

Just like pledges to uphold the law,

trust and work obligations are also

commitments or contracts

freely entered into...."34

For a person who has reached stage six,

33

Kohlberg,

34
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p.411.

moral behavior is
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"guided by universal ethical principles.

Particular laws are...

valid because they rest on such principles."
way because,

"as a rational person,

One behaves this

one has seen the validity of

principles and has become committed to them."

This highest stage

is consistent with Kant's vision of an autonomous will guided
solely by reason.
Thus,

concentrating on stages three through six,

Kohlberg

depicts a line of development which moves from "mutual
interpersonal expectations," to a drive to maintain social
systems,

to a stage where relations are viewed as contractual.

The highest stage derives from a Kantian social perspective of a
"rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the
basic moral premise of respect for other persons as ends,

not

means."35
Kohlberg's hierarchy of principles is like current
medical ethics,

for both award the greatest respect to the

Kantian principle of autonomy.
the ethics of rights.

Both systems are consistent with

In addition,

Kohlberg explicitly describes

the desire to maintain relationships because of human feeling as
a less advanced principle,

to be surpassed by learning to see

relationships as essentially contractual.

Gilligan's Critique
In the early 1970's,

Carol Gilligan, hoping to study the

reasoning of persons in actual,

35

Ibid.

as opposed to hypothetical, moral
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dilemmas,

cast about for an appropriate research topic.

Gilligan

chose to study pregnant women who were considering abortions.
The women discussed their own real dilemma,
upon hypothetical cases,

and also reflected

such as the Heinz dilemma.

Her method

thus differed from that of Kohlberg, who used only hypothetical
dilemmas.

Gilligan noticed that when women's responses were

graded according to Kohlberg's stages,
of conventional reasoning,
educational background.

few women passed the level

as compared to men of similar age and

Gilligan also drew attention to the fact

that all the subjects in Kohlberg's original study,

from which he

derived his stages, were male.
These observations could be explained in a number of
different ways.

Kohlberg,

like his predecessors in psychology,

believed that women were in fact limited in their moral
development.

He hoped,

though,

that as they moved beyond the

domestic sphere and into the professions,

the more complex moral

dilemmas they encountered would stimulate their development to
stages five and six.36
Gilligan preferred a different explanation.

She suggested

that women's moral reasoning is neither stunted nor
developmentally delayed,

as had been suggested by Freud and

Piaget before Kohlberg, but that it honors principles neglected
in systems like that of Kohlberg.

We will describe the moral

principles elicited by Gilligan as an ethics of responsibility,

36
Lawrence Kohlberg and R. Kramer, "Continuities and
Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development," Human
Development. 1969, Vol. 12, pp.93-120.
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or of care.

The ethics described by Kohlberg we will refer to as

the ethics of justice,

or of rights.

A Different Developmental Sequence
According to Gilligan,

what Kohlberg has described is one

possible sequence of moral development,

but one that does not

apply to the women in the abortion study.

Gilligan proposes that

the moral development of these women follows a different
sequence,

which she sets out to describe.

three stages,

This sequence includes

and these are demarcated by two transitional

phases.
The first and most primitive of these three stages
characterized by the quest for personal
stage one cares only for the self,

survival.

is

A person in

and sees the needs of others

exclusively in terms of self-interest.
is provided by one of the participants

An example of such logic
in the abortion study,

in

response to the Heinz dilemma:
Stealing might be wrong, but if you have to do it to
survive yourself or even kill, that is what you should
do.... Preservation of oneself, I think, is the most
important thing.
It comes before anything else in life.37
This first phase recedes as one begins to realize that the
exclusive pursuit of personal survival

is selfish;

of such self-criticism marks the first transition.

the emergence
A person

whose reasoning attains the second phase eschews the selfishness

37
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological
Theory and Women's Development. Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1982, p.76.
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of the past,

and seeks instead for a new sense of responsibility

and social participation.
deficiencies, however,

for in it the needs of others are placed

above those of the self,
ideal.

This new phase is not without

and self-sacrifice stands as the moral

Moral choice at this stage closely resembles that

assigned to the stereotype of the all-loving,

all-giving mother.

Gilligan offers a number of examples of this "feminine
identification of goodness with self-sacrifice."38
deciding whether or not to abort,

One woman,

in

discussed her responsibilities

not only toward the fetus and her unsupportive lover,

but also

toward his wife and children, without giving equivalent
consideration to her own needs.

Another young woman described

her inability to criticize thus:

"I never want to hurt anyone,

and I tell them in a nice way,
opinions,

and I have respect for their

and they can do the things they want."39 Concealed

within this "niceness" is a passivity,

a willingness to let

others act and to attribute one's own actions to another's
demands or needs.
Although this level of reasoning betrays some philosophic
inconsistency,

it also reveals some positive attributes within

the ethics of care.
hurting others,
justice.

Already displayed are the desire to avoid

even if this should entail bending the rules of

Also visible is the goal of maintaining relationships

between the parties in a dispute,

38
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even though it may require,

at
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this stage,

a sacrifice of personal aims.

The second transition commences when the individual realizes
that violence is done to the self by a too exclusive concern for
the needs of others.
into question,

The passivity of the second phase comes

and these women face clearly and honestly their

identity as the maker of moral choices.

They take responsibility

for decisions and their consequences. Thus,

in the third phase,

one strives to incorporate the self into that community which is
deserving of non-violent treatment; there is a balance of care
for self and other.
Throughout her book, Gilligan argues that progress in moral
reasoning is linked to progress in self-concept; women whose
reasoning attains the third level persistently refer to this
link,

offering evidence for Gilligan's contention.

For example,

one woman describes herself in the past thus:
Usually paying off some sort of debt, going around
serving people who are not really worthy of my attention,
because somewhere in life I got the impression that my needs
are really secondary to other people's, and that if I...make
any demands on other people to fulfill my needs, I'd feel
guilty for it and submerge my own in favor of other
people's, which backfires on me, and I feel a great deal of
resentment for other people....^0
Having reflected on the errors of these past perceptions,

the

same woman goes on to describe her current ideas of
responsibility:
I have this responsibility to myself, and you know, for once
I am beginning to realize that that really matters to me.
Instead of doing what I want for myself and feeling guilty
over how selfish I am, you realize that that is a very usual
40
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way for people to live....41
This woman comes to accept her needs as equivalent in weight to
those of the people she loves.

Her stance is neither excessively

selfish nor self-sacrificing.
In summary,

Gilligan's sequence moves from selfishness

toward a sense of responsibility for others instead of for the
self.

From this emphasis on self-sacrifice,

view that self and other are interdependent,

one moves to the
and that both

deserve attention within the ethics of care.

Although Gilligan

describes this third phase as the highest within her system,

she

suggests that even greater maturity and moral insight are reached
by those who blend her system with Kohlberg's,

taking into

consideration both the ethics of responsibility and of rights.

Distinguishing Features: Maintaining Relations
Apart from a different set of stages,

this new orientation

has several characteristics which distinguish it from Kohlberg's
system.

Chief among these differences is the emphasis on

maintaining relations among disputing parties.

Indeed,

it is

this feature which provides the springboard for Gilligan's attack
on Kohlberg.

In Kohlberg's system,

such social concern causes a

response to be ranked as stage three out of six,
by conventional rather than principled reasoning.

i.e.,

one guided

However,

concern is central to so many of the female participants in
Gilligan's abortion study that the vast majority of their
41
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responses are categorized as conventional.

It is women's concern

for maintaining relations that is considered in Kohlberg's system
as "immature."

The core of Gilligan's argument is that this

concern is mature and appropriate; that it has been deemed
otherwise is the result of a persistent,
in psychological theory.

long-standing distortion

Gilligan indicts not only Kohlberg for

the work that causes women's responses to seem deficient;
also criticizes such renowned figures as Freud,
Erikson.

It is,

in part,

she

Piaget and

this wide-ranging nature of her

critique that garnered for Gilligan's book so much attention,
both favorable and unfavorable.
Gilligan argues that earlier writers have singled out such
values as independence and detachment as goals of maturity,
have undervalued interdependence and attachment.

and

If

psychological development has traditionally been viewed as a
struggle for ever more independence, moral development has
appeared in an analogous fashion,

as a struggle for increasing

intellectual detachment and autonomy.

Such a view is consistent

with the ethics described by Kohlberg, with its rule-oriented
approach to moral reasoning. Gilligan argues that this over¬
emphasis on detachment is not only inaccurate,

in that it does

not describe the development of women, but also that it is
philosophically inadequate,

in that it denies the importance of

attachment in morality.
In more recent work,

Gilligan has considered the origins of

both the care and justice orientations in moral reasoning.

She
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theorizes that both "voices" arise from certain profound
childhood experiences.

One such experience is that of inequality,

the child's "awareness of being smaller and less capable than
adults and older children."42

From this experience,

Gilligan

argues, psychologists have learned to define morality as justice,
and development as progress toward equality and independence.
However,

Gilligan notes,

the experience of attachment is as

prevalent and as critical as that of inequality in shaping
children's notions of right and wrong,

and it is from this

experience that the care orientation derives.

She finds that the

majority of women and men, when asked to resolve moral conflicts,
will introduce both justice and care concerns,

but will focus

their reasoning on one orientation or the other. Women who focus
tend to do so almost equally in either category, while men who
focus do so almost exclusively in the justice orientation.
Gilligan's work has been quite controversial,
relates to sex differences.

particularly as it

A careful reading of her work,

particularly the more recent studies,

reveals that her concern is

not simply about the devaluation of women's moral judgments;
also defends men who reason within the ethics of care.

she

Rather,

she decries the notion that attachment is unworthy to affect
moral questions.

Gilligan does not insist that women always

reason one way and men another, but that there are two moral
viewpoints that deserve to be heard respectfully.

42
Carol Gilligan and Grant Wiggins, "The Origins of
Morality in Early Childhood Relationships," unpublished draft,
November, 1985, p.5.
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Gilligan uses two opposites of the word "dependence"

to

reveal salient differences in the two systems:
These contrasting opposites of dependence — independence
and isolation — illuminate the shift in the valence of
relationships that occurs when connection with others is
experienced as impeding autonomy and when it is experienced
as protecting against isolation.43
One's

ideas about attachment alter notions about whether

detachment is good or bad.

From this example we learn much about

how Gilligan views the two moral orientations.
justice provides a "better" way of seeing,
a vastly different viewpoint;

so different,

Neither care nor

but each does provide
in fact,

orientation seems to require a different language.

that each
Thus,

a

concept like dependence may have a radically different meaning,
and may be subject to either praise or blame,
point of view.

according to one's

The lessons of one orientation may be inaudible

to those who speak the language of the other.
In addition to providing insight about how misunderstandings
arise,

Gilligan's example of the contrasting opposites of

dependence reveals some of her reservations about standard
notions of moral maturity.

By inviting the concept of attachment

into the moral domain,

Gilligan causes us to re-examine

traditional concepts.

She challenges the notion that detachment

is essential

for mature moral judgment,

and asks us

instead to

imagine circumstances when detachment can prevent moral reasoning

43
Carol Gilligan, "Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images
of the Self in Relationship," in Reconstructing Individualism,
ed. by Ian Watt; Palo Alto, California, Stanford University
Press, 1986, p.251-2.

‘

42

from reaching its full potential.

Thus,

"the seemingly valuable

capacity to resist impulses toward domination and treat self and
other with equal respect can be seen as the problematic
to resist moral feeling and turn away from need."44

ability

We shall

return to this problem when we discuss the concept of emotional
neutrality in the legal system,
For Gilligan,

in chapter V.

the link between morality and relation is not

part of a phase to be outgrown, but is the necessary context for
moral choice.

The recognition of attachment,

also known as love,

is the central difference between the systems of Gilligan and
Kohlberg.

Indeed,

this concept is of such singular importance in

Gilligan's model that all other distinguishing features follow
from it.

We shall investigate further the interaction of

attachment and morality in chapter VI, when we examine Iris
Murdoch's work.

Rules and Their Role
Piaget observed that boys and girls at play evinced notably
different ideas about how and when rules ought to be used.
Gilligan builds on this work to describe how rules are perceived
within the ethics of care.

Piaget noted a certain zest in boys

for the elaboration of rules,

and of procedures for settling

conflicts, while girls exhibited a "tolerant attitude toward
rules."45
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More recent work has tended to corroborate Piaget's
observations. When psychologist Janet Lever studied children's
games,

she found that when faced with conflict,

the game rather than fight.

Boys,

girls tend to end

on the other hand,

seem to

view the analysis and adjudication of conflict as an integral
part of the game.46

In the flexible attitude displayed by girls

toward rules, we can see the force of their notion of attachment.
The game and its rules are not worth as much as the maintenance
of peaceful relations. This attitude has in the past been part of
what has caused Freud and other writers to find in women a poorly
formed moral sense.

Gilligan contests this,

arguing that in

certain circumstances, moral maturity may lie precisely in the
ability to value relationships over rules.

Specific Cases
During her work on abortion decisions and in subsequent
research,

Gilligan noted more frequently in girls and women an

eagerness to know the particulars of a situation; they seemed
dissatisfied with the information provided in hypothetical
dilemmas.

For instance,

in responding to the Heinz dilemma,

girls persistently asked for additional information about the
involved parties.

Was Heinz a poor man,

oppressed minority?
The implication,
curiosity,

or a member of an

Was he likely to be treated fairly in court?

and often the explicit justification for this

is that details make a difference.

46 Quoted in Gilligan,

Different Voice,

The particulars of

p.9.

V.
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a dispute,

including the identities and circumstances of the

people involved,

matter enormously in terms of designing a

morally correct solution.

Gilligan's volunteers are not the only

ones dissatisfied with hypotheticals.
medical

Male,

as well as female,

students will often press for details,

feel the case cannot be resolved,
hyupothetical moral dilemmas.47

without which they

when presented with
Hence,

not always provide adequate guidance.

rules

in the abstract do

The flaws of blind justice

are discussed more fully in the following chapter.
The implication is that those who reason within the care
orientation,

as the girls and women did,

are unwilling to make

certain basic assumptions in order to "solve" the Heinz dilemma.
One such assumption is that the disputing parties are equal;
party has equal

freedom of choice,

their decisions.

and equal power to act upon

This emphasis on equality fits

moral community hinted at by Veatch.
reasoners do not assume equality,
inequalities exist,
of the "right"

each

in well with the

By contrast,

care-oriented

but instead suspect that

and that they will radically alter the nature

solution.

Their desire to balance inequities of

power and need causes these women discomfort in responding to
hypothetical dilemmas.

This difference in approach is one result

of the shift from an ethics of rights to one of responsibilities.

Uncertainty
If women tend to demote rules as generating inadequate

47
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solutions,

it is not because they find greater certainty in

another method.

Indeed, many responders attribute their

skepticism about rules to their belief that moral dilemmas can
not be resolved with perfect clarity.
suspect,

Clarity itself becomes

for fear that such certainty has been purchased by

neglecting some subtle yet vital aspect of the situation.
essay,

In her

"On Morality," Joan Didion reflects a profound distrust of

moral certainty:
There is some sinister hysteria in the air out here
tonight, some hint of the monstrous perversion to which any
human idea can come.
’I followed my conscience.'
'I did
what I thought was best.'
How many madmen have said it and
meant it?
How many murderers?...Maybe we have all said it,
and maybe we have been wrong.
Except on the most primitive
level — our loyalties to those we love — what could be
more arrogant than to claim the primacy of personal
conscience?48
Didion equates certainty with a "monstrous" arrogance,

except

when it occurs in the context of attachment.
Gilligan's responders echo this mistrust of certainty, based
on their conviction that there is always another way of looking
at a situation.

In noting that their system of moral reasoning

"leaves them with conflict," these women do not see the lack of
clarity as a flaw in the system, but as an inevitable problem in
making moral choices.
through attachment.

What certainty there is,

is revealed

Here the responsibility-centered reasoners

differ from their rights-centered counterparts, who feel that by
correctly applying the right principles in a detached fashion,

48
Joan Didion, "On Morality," Slouching Toward Bethlehem.
New York, Washington Square Books, 1968, p.161.
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the right solution can be unequivocally determined.
avoid the influence of personal feelings.
quoted adolescent boy,

One ought to

For example,

one much

reasoning within the ethics of rights,

stated that the Heinz dilemma is "like a math problem with
humans."49
Why is it that the shift of emphasis from rights to
responsibilities should lead to the acceptance of uncertainty?
The answer,

at least in part,

lies in the belief that "right"

answers are determined not by a permanent hierarchy of
principles, which guide conduct among rational equals, but by a
shifting network of inequities.

The "right" answer in a dispute

among equals might not serve at all when one person is more
vulnerable,

or otherwise more in need of protection.

There are, however,

other plausible explanations for the

uncertainty so prevalent among care-oriented reasoners.

One is

that the women who predominantly make up Gilligan's sample do not
find their style of reasoning supported by society as a whole.
The experience of being told repeatedly that their concerns are
not moral concerns,

and that their reservations about

hypothetical dilemmas are not valid,
own judgments.

causes them to doubt their

Their experience is not unlike that of some

doctors, whose reasoning focusses on the care of patients,

yet

whose decisions are judged within the ethics of rights to be
inconsistent or irrelevant.
Although Gilligan attributes part of the blame for this
49
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uncertainty to society's justice-oriented bias,

she also finds

the care orientation itself to be partly at fault.

Gilligan

offers numerous examples of women who lose sight of their own
point of view by their very ability to take into account the
viewpoints of so many others.

Consider,

for instance,

the young

woman who accepted an abortion she did not want because of her
perceived responsibilities toward the wife and children of her
unsupportive lover.
In the end,

Gilligan finds uncertainty to be an inherent,

but not necessarily an admirable feature of the care orientation.
It is,

perhaps,

a flaw which balances an equivalent error in the

justice orientation.

She relates her view thus:

If the persistent error in care reasoning is vacillation and
lack of clear judgment, resulting from a tendency to include
all possible ways of seeing, the persistent danger in the
justice-reasoner is moral arrogance, the irrational faith in
the infallibility of judgments from principles rigidly
applied to a situation.5*^
Gilligan does not view the care orientation as superior to the
justice orientation, but as a counterpart to it.

The goal is not

to substitute one orientation for the other, but to incorporate
the lessons of each into an approach that corresponds to the
complexity of human dilemmas.
In summary,

Gilligan offers us a new context in which to

consider moral development and moral choice.
favors attachment over detachment,

This orientation

and this increased emphasis on

relation causes a shift in the value of other attributes.

50
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As we

3 .

turn our gaze to the legal system, we will question its
assumptions in much the same way that Gilligan has challenged
Kohlberg.
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Chapter V:

Implications for Medical Ethics

No Contest
Before distinguishing further the ethics of rights from the
ethics of responsibility,

let me set to rest one misconception:

the ethics of rights is not a "bad" system exclusively favored by
lawyers,

in contrast to a "good” system favored by doctors.

The

ethics of rights is the mainstream voice of moral reasoning in
our society.

Kohlberg did not set out to describe the moral

reasoning of lawyers, but of people in general.

Gilligan did not

set out to correct legal thought, but to argue that moral
reasoning ought rightly to include an acknowledgment of the
interdependence of human beings.

The flaw in reasoning about

proxy decisions cannot be simply ascribed to lawyers; nor is the
solution to exclude legal intervention.

The flaw is as much in

the medical profession for not having learned to fashion
decisions that are consistent and clear,

and yet which

incorporate the weight of subjective and emotional knowledge.
Arguments persistently erupt about whether doctors or
lawyers ought to make decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining
treatments.

Although doctors have long been involved in helping

families through such decisions,
well trained to do so,

it is not clear that they are

or that they are experts in this area.

Although bonds exist between patients,

doctors and families that

establish the basis from which responsible decisions spring,

this

.
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relation does not in and of itself guarantee good decisions.
these,

For

one needs excellent communication and clear thinking to

help families sort out the various technical,
emotional dimensions of the dilemma.

ethical and

Not all doctors possess

these qualities.
Many lawyers believe these decisions are properly legal
ones.

George Annas strongly defends the adversary process as the

best means for airing the viewpoints of all interested parties,
and thus arriving at a disinterested version of the facts.
However, Annas also states:
Judges are asked to decide this question not because they
have any special expertise, but because only they can
provide the physicians with civil and criminal immunity for
their actions.
In seeking this immunity, legal
considerations quickly transcend ethical and medical
judgments.51
Annas,

staunch defender of legal intervention,

admits that courts

are not asked to intervene because of concern for the patient.
The legal expertise demanded focuses on the threat of punishment
to others,

and thus represents a shunting away of attention from

the vulnerable patient — a theme we shall return to later in the
chapter.

Although Annas believes that the courts nonetheless

produce good decisions,

it is not because of specifically legal

expertise, but because the courts extend their mandate to include
ethical issues.
Thus, both law and medicine reach beyond technical expertise

51
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in grappling with issues of life-sustaining treatment.

In

general, because of their direct observation of the patient,
doctors and families are well situated to determine which
measures are benefits or burdens,

and thus to approach the

ethical dilemma with relevant data.

For this reason, most proxy

decisions are made without legal intervention.

However,

not possible to entirely escape legal supervision,

it is

for there will

always be cases in which doctors and families cannot agree.
accord with the President's Commission,

In

I feel that there are

many fewer genuinely difficult cases than are commonly
expected.52

By relying on the ethics of responsibility,

and so

creating clear, principled, humane decisions, we should be able
to drastically reduce the need for judicial intervention.
The enormous effort expended on procedural matters,

such as

who should decide, distracts us from the task of deciding what
should be done.

When physicians and courts have decided well,

they have bent the traditional rules of analysis,

and have

included subjective and emotional factors. They have not always
been clear, however,

that this is what they are doing.

poor decisions have been made,

ones which uphold the rights but

not the needs of the vulnerable patient,
fault of the courts.
closely,

Indeed,

that of John Storar,

And when

it is not always the

in the case we shall examine most
the courts sided with the

physicians and against the family,

52
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patient.
As we discuss the ethics of care,

some physicians may feel

that these concepts are not entirely new,
correct.

and they would be

The ethics of responsibility borrows form the

Hippocratic tradition its insistence on care, while leaving
behind the image of the doctor as sole decision-maker.

The

ethics of responsibility incorporates notions that match an oldfashioned ideal of the physician as an empathetic person who
fought for cure yet never neglected to comfort the dying.
new-found ability to cure,

or at least to intervene,

denigrate this ancient duty.
failures.

The

leads us to

Dying patients do not represent our

Yet sometimes they appear to,

and so our best efforts

are expended in devising ways and reasons to treat.

Although we

should continue to seek cure where possible, we ought also to
devote more energy to the care of the dying.
The ethics of rights and of responsibility are not mutually
exclusive.

One need not reject the concept of rights in order to

accept the ethics of responsibility.

Rather,

this new ethics is

an attempt to incorporate concepts which are central to medical
decision-making, yet which are difficult to express within the
rights model.
Although physicians,

families and lawyers have all had

occasion for dissatisfaction with legal remedies, most
participants are willing to accept the system's flaws because
they believe no reasonable alternative exists.

The flaws of

rights-based ethics in resolving medical dilemmas do not
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represent necessary evils, however, but reveal instead that the
legal context is fundamentally ill-suited to solving such
dilemmas.
By using Gilligan's ideas about relationship and
responsibility as a point of departure, we can fashion a
framework for resolving medical dilemmas — an ethics of care —
which improves on the current legal model.

Rights in Action
Let us begin by examining rights-based ethics in action,
i.e.,

in the courts.

Each of the disputing parties hires a

representative who presents the case as favorably as possible for
his or her client.

Generally,

clients cease to communicate

directly with each other, but interact only with their lawyers.
The lawyers communicate less with each other than with the judge.
In short,

a series of barriers to communication is interposed

between the disputants. The presentations of the two lawyers are
evaluated by a judge, who is ideally neutral,
which representation is correct.

Thus,

and who will decide

essential features of a

court case are the adversarial positions of the two disputing
parties,

the exchange of direct communication for third party

communication,

and the presence of a neutral observer,

the judge,

in whom rests the final authority.
Two sets of objections may be raised against this
theoretical description of the legal process.
things don't work that way.

One is empirical:

The other is moral: we ought not to
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do it that way.

Let us address the empirical question first,

and

ask in what ways this picture is factually inaccurate.
The question of judges'

impartiality,

specifically as it

operates within medical dilemmas, has been addressed by Robert
Burt in his interesting book, Taking Care of Strangers.53

Burt

attacks the concept of the "choiceless self-conception," the
notion that judges are mere conduits of justice.
this idea,

According to

judges apply rules of law in a way that is not

influenced by personal or emotional concerns.
"I" who wrestles with issues as only he can,

The judge is not an
and decides for

reasons that are unique to him as an individual.

Rather,

the

judge is a very advanced sort of computer who dissects the case
into its component parts,
which are,

and analyses these according to rules

theoretically, publicly knowable.

The judge then

spews out an answer — the same answer that any other properly
functioning computer would give.

In this way the judge is

"choiceless;" he is merely a location where there occurs a
rational,

theoretically repeatable process.

This definition of

the judge's role conforms to the concept of "legalism," as
described by philosophers John Ladd and Judith Shklar.
legalism means,

To them,

"the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to

be a matter of rule following,

and moral relationships to consist

of duties and rights determined by rules."54
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This
detached,

"choiceless"

judge,

who is utterly rational and

is most at home in the ethics of justice,

by Kohlberg.

There is one right answer,

with certainty by the process of reason.

as described

which can be discovered
But this definition of

the moral agent does not correspond to reality,

as

it exists

in

the courts.
Burt notes that the concept of choicelessness was attacked
as long ago as the 1930's by the "legal realists."

However,

also points out that those authors failed to see the
power"

of this choiceless self-conception.55

he

"seductive

Interestingly,

Burt

attributes the allure of the concept to the judge's desire to
escape the painful burden of responsibility.
Burt suggests that judges are not impartial,
cases of life and death.
conduits of justice,

They maintain a pose that they are

and that they are unmoved by the impact of

their decision on the life of the patient.
neutrality is,
case,
not,
made,

however,

a fiction.

The pose of

The very act of analyzing a

and deciding which issues need concern us,
sets the case in a certain light.
according to Burt,

Such decisions are not
Neither is

the right decision follows

In the medical dilemmas which concern us,

the problem is one of moral choice.
to decide

and which do

on a purely rational basis.

it true that if the facts are clear,
obviously from them.

especially in

There may be factual

(can this patient feel pain?)

issues

but the greatest

difficulties arise in deciding the moral aspect of the case

55
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it right to terminate life support systems for a patient who
feels,

or does not feel,

pain?).

The emotional neutrality of

judges may be compromised in any type of case,

but is

particularly at risk in medical cases.
While judges cannot escape the impact of emotion,

its effect

is far greater on the patient's family members and physician,

who

are attached to the patient by special relationships that make
emotional neutrality an impossibility.

And here is where the

moral objection to legalism arises — we should not aspire to the
impartiality the law requires.
connection,

not denying it,

It is by acknowledging

that we make appropriate moral

decisions.

The Legal Battle
An essential aspect of the legal
nature.

system is its adversarial

How does this opposition function in relation to medical

dilemmas?

Again,

we are confronted by the sensation of an

improper fit between legalism and the task of making decisions
for incompetent patients.

First of all,

the relationship between

doctors and families is not inherently an adversarial one.
Indeed,

it must at one time have been otherwise or there would be

no such relationship.
however,

lends official

The entrance into the legal

system,

status to whatever pre-existing

hostilities there might have been.
If we return to the moment where the family and patient
first make contact with the doctor,

we find that,

far from being

1
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adversaries,

all are united by their common responsibility for

the patient's welfare.
disagree,

Thus,

these various parties,

though they

are not fundamentally opposed to one another,

matter how bitterly they may dispute the methods,

for no

they work

toward a common goal.
One might argue — with some justice — that it is unfair to
blame the legal system for all animosity between disputing
parties.

Considerable tension must exist before a medical

question arrives in a court of law.

However,

the experience in

court is unlikely to dissipate existing tensions.
contrary,

On the

any revival of trust becomes increasingly unlikely

because the disputants have little direct communication, while
the lawyers depict the actions of the opposition in the most
unfavorable light possible.

As a result,

one good outcome — the

restoration of cordial relations between family and doctor —
becomes a virtual impossibility before we even begin to resolve
the medical dilemma.

Thus,

the imposition of the legal system

onto medical dilemmas injects an adversarial note which is
neither fundamental to them,

nor helpful in crafting a

responsible resolution of them.

The severance of relations and

trust which accompany the conclusion of this sort of medical
dispute is not a legal success, but a medical tragedy:

the

network of persons jointly concerned for the patient's welfare is
destroyed.
Hostility is not simply a part of the legal process;
essential to the very concept of rights.

As Ladd argues:

it is
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To have a right is to have a right against someone...The
natural and normal situation in which one asserts a right
occurs when the person against whom it is asserted
threatens, neglects, or otherwise appears unwilling to
accede to one's requests, needs, or demands... In sum, the
concept of rights is most characteristically invoked in an
adversary context.56
The standard position of participants in the legal system is
to accept the adversarial nature of law as a necessary evil.
one thing,

For

it is thought to be an efficient means of uncovering

truth; the lawyers, who defend their clients as aggressively as
possible,

are tireless in their efforts to unearth unflattering

data about the opposing side.
form of this argument.
among various parties,
patient.

Robert Burt presents an unusual

He discusses the imbalances of power
including the judge and the incompetent

He claims that the adversarial process is helpful in

protecting the patient from being "overpowered" in legal
proceedings,

because families and doctors are more likely to

consider the patient's needs if they fear legal punishment for
improper decisions.57

Burt also indicates that if families and

doctors learn to respect patients as they ought,
be fewer decisions to terminate treatment.

the result will

His contention is

based on an inappropriate definition of respect, which we shall
discuss in the following chapter.
Contrary to what Burt suggests,

I feel that the threat of

punishment is more likely to prevent appropriate decision-making
than to encourage it.
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Communication will hardly be fostered in

,
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such an atmosphere, yet it is sorely needed if all parties are to
discuss their responsibilities and concerns for the patient.
Indeed,

the fear of reprisals serves to remove concern for the

patient from center stage,
one's own survival,

and place there instead concern for

as well as excessive worry for how an

anonymous third party might view this decision from the outside.
Sartre describes such a situation by asking us to imagine
that someone catches us in the act of looking through a keyhole.
Even if we are doing this because someone in the room has asked
us to do so,

in order to know what can be seen through the

keyhole, we are made to feel guilt or shame because of the
"suspicious stare of the Other."58

Similarly, physicians and

families who know their actions could be evaluated in court,
experience a shift in their own view of the decision-making
process.

This threatening influence leads to more concern about

how things look,

than about how they are.

Burt accepts the threat of punishment as necessary to ensure
that adequate attention is paid to the decision-making process.
The adversarial nature of the justice system serves as a harsh
sort of study aid, much like the hickory stick of the one-room
school house.

But we need to ask ourselves if such attention --

by force — is well-suited to making the kinds of moral choices
that participants face.
Burt sidesteps this issue;

I would like to examine it

58 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness.
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directly.

It is possible to describe moral choice — outside of

the ethics of rights — in such a way that emotion and attention
are organic parts of the decision-making process.
required,

Threats are not

for attention is already riveted by the nature of the

responsibility of choice.
Burt recognizes that emotionality enters into these
decisions,
of

yet he remains within the adversary system.

The level

debate is thereby reduced to moral choice at what Kohlberg

and Gilligan would agree is an extremely primitive level.
as if moral choice falls into neat halves.
one thing or all of another;
irrational,

i.e.,

It is either all of

it is entirely rational or entirely

emotional.

Relations among persons are

similarly dichotomous; either they are paternalistic,
sense of one party being overpowered by the other,
individualistic,

It is

in the

or they are

in the sense of both parties being wholly free

and unrelated to each other.
Caroline Whitbeck refers to this kind of attitude as
"dualism," which she finds throughout the ethics of rights.59
Whitbeck correctly argues that the dualist approach is not our
only alternative.

It is possible to construct a system which is

not fundamentally adversarial,
do not stand as opposites.

and in which attachment and reason

In such a system,

relations among

persons need be neither paternalistic nor atomistic.

This shift

59
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Philosophy, ed. by Carol Gould, Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman and
Allanheld, 1983.
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in the nature of relation changes the nature of moral choice.

Varieties of Attachment
An examination of relationship is crucial to our
understanding of the ethics of responsibility.

Let us first

examine the relation of doctor and patient.

We will draw a

picture in which emotion is notably lacking,

and then ask how

this image differs from reality.
In this extreme example, the doctor is viewed as a
business consultant.

The patient,

in managing his health,

becomes aware of a problem, yet lacks relevant information.

He

or she then asks the doctor to gather and analyze data,

and to

provide a set of alternative solutions.

the

Thus informed,

patient selects one of these options.

As in any other business

decision,

convenience,

considerations such as cost,

and risk are

factored into the equation.
There are a number of flaws with this picture of the
doctor's role.

From an empirical point of view,

it is not

possible to achieve such a perfect sharing of information between
doctor and patient.

The doctor's years of experience in

relevantly similar cases may lead him or her to believe that in
this particular case,

one option surpasses the others,

reasons that may prove impossible to fully express.
it would be surprising (and inadvisable)

for

In addition,

in serious matters for a

doctor to have no preference for one treatment over another.

And

having such a preference, the doctor would no doubt communicate
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it, however subtly.

In the majority of cases,

therefore,

it

would be impossible for doctors to present neutrally a list of
options for the patient to consider.

The doctor can not entirely

avoid the burden of authority, but will to some degree maintain
the advantage in terms of information; the patient must to that
extent trust the doctor.
This matter of trust is interesting,
emotional connotations.

for it has distinctly

And if the relation between doctors and

patients is emotional in this respect, might it not be in others
as well?

Indeed,

a host of powerful,

although often unspoken

emotions spring up between doctor and patient.
emotions,

To ignore these

or to argue that they ought not to occur,

the fact that they do in fact exist,

is to belie

and that they exert an

impact on the way medical decisions are made.

Let us then

proceed to examine the nature of the attachment between doctor
and patient.

The Burden of Responsibility
If we investigate the feelings of doctors for patients, we
will discover more subtle relations than mere paternalism.

There

is a sensation that includes more emotional content than is
generally understood by the phrase "professional responsibility,"
and which is evoked by knowledge of the patient's predicament.
These feelings may be relieved by a favorable outcome,
more painful when the outcome is poor,
not the physician has been at fault.

but become

regardless of whether or
These emotions, which
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motivate the physician to improve the patient's health,

are not

solely derived from the desire to honor the obligations of the
implicit contract,
psychiatry,

or to avoid punishment.

In the language of

these feelings would be described as a form of

counter-transference.
One example of this emotionality is the desire to "save"
patients.

This rescue fantasy,

physicians,
reality,

perhaps more common among young

is most in evidence when most cruelly challenged by

as when first a patient dies who has been in one's care.

The sense of failure that arises on such occasions is too
commonly experienced to be ignored as part of doctors'

attachment

to patients.
One source of this emotion may be the patient's
vulnerability.

Robert Burt gives illuminating examples of the

effect of the weak on the strong.

He discusses the relationship

of parent and child,

in which the parent has considerable

authority and power,

and yet is often controlled by the demands

and needs of the child.60

The apparently weaker member of a pair

is not therefore without certain types of power,

for the

vulnerable can and do make powerful claims upon those responsible
for them.

Thus,

though the patient is dependent upon the doctor,

so is the doctor dependent upon the patient.

This

interdependence of doctor and patient is the most significant
aspect of the attachment between them.
feature of the ethics of responsibility,
60

Burt, p.66-7.

It is an essential
yet it is impossible to
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describe within the ethics of rights.
It may be,

as Burt and other authors have argued,

see in the weak our own past helplessness,
frightening to contemplate,

that we

and even more

our helplessness that is yet to be.

It follows that we care for others in the way we hope to be cared
for.

We protect the weak because we can not bear to think of

ourselves as unprotected.
More onerous responses to weakness are possible,
avoidance and fear.

such as

One may observe on the wards the diminishing

amounts of time that the health care team spends with patients
who are known to be dying,
attempted.

and for whom a cure is no longer to be

This avoidance is occasionally attributed to the

desire to allow patients privacy in their last days, but also
includes a measure of discomfort comprised of guilt and fear.
Perhaps there is also a degree of helplessness,
cannot rescue,

for when we

doctors are often at a loss.

What Patients Feel
As patients we learn that feelings toward our doctors can
cover quite a range of emotions.

In some circumstances, we see

the physician as Virgil to our Dante; they are our guide through
hell.

Unwittingly, we lend strength to the doctor's rescue

fantasy, by asking to be rescued.

Our illusion is supported by

the mysterious technology with which the doctor is surrounded,
and by the arcane language he or she understands.
even for those who are doctors,

This holds true

for it is entirely possible to
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find oneself a complete novice when affected by a disease that
lies outside one's area of expertise.
is not always,
irritation,

of course, unbounded.

Our admiration for doctors
Indeed, we may experience

anger and disappointment, to a degree usually

reserved for family members, when doctors fall short of our
expectations.

This strength of emotional response testifies to

the unusual nature of the bond between doctor and patient.

This

bond arises in part from the doctor's special access to private
information about the patient.
patient's body,

The permission to examine the

and to ask questions which are highly personal

and potentially embarrassing,

is unprecedented even within family

relationships.

The Family
The families of very ill and incompetent patients are in a
position similar in some ways to that of the doctor.

They help

fulfill the role of protector; they look out for the patient's
interests when the patient cannot; they may be able to understand
risks and options that the patient cannot comprehend.
respects, the family becomes like a patient.
question the doctor,

doctor.

They are obliged to

and to participate in decisions in ways that

competent patients do for themselves.
family,

In other

The well-being of the

tied to the health of its members,

depends upon the

There emerges from this role a strange combination of

power and powerlessness.
This role is made all the more complicated by the complex
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emotions that arise from the illness of a loved one.
are the more laudable sentiments,
patient's pain,
disability,

to exist,

such as sympathy for the

sorrow for the various limitations

imposed by

and even sorrow for one's own potential

is also the potential,

however,

Among these

loss.

There

for less praiseworthy sentiments

such as resentment of the patient because of his or her

dependence and the demands made on one because of it,
anger at the patient who may,
the loved one behind.

Also,

as a result of this

as well as

illness,

as in the case of doctors,

leave

the sight

of a helpless and suffering patient may cause family members to
fear their own potentially similar fate.
Thus we see that not only judges,

but patients,

families,

and doctors have emotions which affect the nature of the
attachments between them and the decisions they make.

To

recognize the existence and the inevitability of emotions,
reject the purported emotional neutrality of legalism.

is to

Medical

ethics does not exist in an emotionally neutral context — nor
should it.

For to deny the emotional content of the attachment

of the various persons concerned for the patient's welfare is to
distort the nature of these relations.

Indeed,

we see that

emotional neutrality is one aspect of legalism which does not
"fit" the context of medical dilemmas.

As John Ladd has written:

...the posture of impersonality, which constitutes the
strength of legalism in one context, is precisely that
characteristic that renders it dysfunctional in other
contexts.
Medical ethics...is specifically — perhaps
uniquely — concerned with situations in which impersonal
and personal considerations overlap and are difficult to

■
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separate from each other.61
Ladd's comment is reminiscent of Gilligan's views on detachment.
When self and other are not equal,
pair is dependent on the other,
"to turn away from need."62
neutrality,

i.e.,

when one member of a

detachment may imply the ability

When the law aims at emotional

it distorts the nature of the bonds between us,

and

the responsibilities that arise from them.
Within the ethics of rights,

attachment,

particularly as

occurs between patients and their families and doctors,
adequately described.

All relationships

it

cannot be

in a legalistic system

are reduced to either contractual obligations or acts of
generosity which one is not bound to perform.

According to Ladd:

When it comes to personal relationships of a more permanent
nature, such as those between friends or between members of
the same family or community, the exhaustive and exclusive
division of morality into obligatory acts and acts of
supererogation that typifies an ethics of rights does not
seem appropriate.
The morality of taking care of another
person with whom one has some kind of personal relationship
cannot be reduced either to an obligation corresponding to a
right or to a gratuitous favor.63
Thus,

within the ethics of rights,

responsibility and care,

it is impossible to describe

which are central aspects of the

interdependent relationships between doctor,
In this context,

patient and family.

where autonomous individuals demand and grant

rights to one another,
that is not contractual

61

Ladd,

62

Gilligan,

63

Ladd,

it is impossible to maintain a relation
in nature.

This

p.14.
Different Voice,

p.22.

p.25.

flaw is particularly
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disturbing in its implications

for medicine.

Burt suggests that there would be fewer decisions to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment if incompetent patients were
considered with more respect.
well

lead to more treatment,

with care,

While the fear of retribution may
such excesses are not synonymous

but lead instead to "defensive medicine."

One indication that more treatment does not indicate more
respect is

in the ominous reference to the Cardiac Care Unit as

the Chi-Chi U,

after a disturbing joke which is popular in

teaching hospitals.

According to the joke,

two sailors are

shipwrecked on an island inhabited by savages.
into a primitive jail.
asked,

The first is brought before the king and

"Which do you choose:

prisoner,

death or chi-chi?"

knowing what death is,

dragged about the island,

is

When at last,

near death,

fellow prisoner,

"When they ask you to choose death or chi-chi,
Shortly thereafter,

brought before the king,
Having been warned,
choose death!"

Then he

and subjected to a seemingly endless

he is thrown back into the cell along with his

choose death."

The puzzled

chooses chi-chi.

series of humiliations and tortures.

he tells him,

Both are thrown

the second prisoner is

who asks him the fateful question.

the second prisoner of course answers,

"Right you are,"

says the king,

"I

"but first —

some chi-chi."
The implications of the joke are painful,
translated into the language of the wards.
patients

as

it is

What physicians do to

in the Chi-Chi Unit is not to care for them,

but to

'
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administer a series of tortures which will postpone,
prevent,

death.

but not

The same activities are also described

colloquially as

flogging or beating.

The point of recounting

this language is not to chastise the house officers who
popularize it,

and who perform the majority of procedures

intensive care units,

but to recognize how they view their role.

There is something about their duties,
measures,"

in

especially "heroic

that is not always consistent with the idea of care.

Perhaps this distortion of the purpose of medicine derives
from the enormous emphasis placed on technology in medicine and
in medical education.

Along with this overvaluation of

intervention and cure,

even when no longer sustained by hope,

there seems to be a complementary devaluation of medicines's duty
to comfort the dying.
In summary,

the legal approach,

the ethics of rights,
dilemmas

fails to help us

for several reasons.

nature of attachment,

which has as

its

in resolving medical

Legalism cannot comprehend the

one of interdependence and responsibility,

within which medical choice is made.

The impediments to direct

communication in the adversarial system prevents us
on the patient.

For the wholly incompetent patient,

maximizing patient autonomy,
rights,

is a harmful

foundation

fiction.

from focusing
the goal of

which is the goal of the ethics of
By pretending to see the patient

who depends on us and on whom we depend as

isolated,

we are

distracted from the task of understanding our responsibilities
toward the vulnerable members of our community.
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Chapter VI:

The Ethics of Responsibility

Principles for Decision-Making
We have asserted that physicians'

decisions must be guided

by standards that are clear and accessible to public discussion.
The following is an attempt to describe standards that are
consistent with the ethics of care.
Rather than attempting to create formal principles, we will
begin by accepting as our first principle Kant's categorical
imperative,

namely:

"Act so as to treat man,

as well as in that of anyone else,
merely as a means."

in one's own person

always as an end,

and never

The ethics of responsibility consists of

substantive norms which interpret this principle of respect for
persons in the context of relationships.

The ethics of rights

also takes as its first principle the categorical imperative.
)

However,

the ethics of rights uses different substantive norms in

order to explain the application of this abstract principle.
What follows is a list of norms for the ethics of responsibility.

1.

Respect for persons demands not only that we refrain from

harming others, but also that we strive to nurture their human
capacities.
2. Human capacities which demand respect include both
autonomy and relationality.
3.

To respect persons, we must respond to them as they
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exist,
4.

not as we wish they were.
The form of knowledge required in order to respect

persons flows from both subjective and objective information,
acquired through "loving attention"

(infra).

5. Moral decisions within the ethics of responsibility
cannot be made simply by applying rules;
require an understanding of context,

such decisions also

and the individuals within

it.

For Kant,

the categorical imperative means that we must

treat other persons with respect because of their autonomy.
Kant's followers,

although not necessarily to Kant,

has come to imply a negative form of freedom,
to be left alone.

i.e.,

such respect
the freedom

Within the ethics of responsibility,

includes positive social cooperation.

To

respect

We must not only keep from

harming others, we must strive to further the realization of
their potential.
This potential that we must nurture is a complex entity,

and

to understand it, we must examine our definition of persons.
Kant describes autonomy as the foundation of human dignity.
Margaret Farley builds on this concept by claiming that both
autonomy and relationality are fundamental human qualities,

and

serve as the basis of our obligation to respect persons.64
Relationality is the capacity or potential to experience other

64
Margaret Farley,
unpublished draft, 1982.

"Obligating-Features of Personhood,"
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persons. Richard McCormick has advanced similar arguments, which
we shall discuss below.65
Although we strive to nurture both autonomy and
relationality,

not all persons exhibit both these attributes.

When we encounter a person who lacks one or both of these
attributes,

it is a violation of respect to ignore this fact of

their existence and treat them as if they do exhibit the
attribute.

A healthy infant,

experiences relation.

for instance,

lacks autonomy yet

When beings lack autonomy,

yet show

relational capacity, we respect them by nurturing their
relational capacity.

For instance, when we apply the ethics of

responsibility to medicine, we see that competent patients may
choose to assert their autonomy without regard for relationality.
An incompetent patient,

on the other hand, will always have some

compromise to autonomy, but may still maintain relational
attributes.

For such a patient, we protect relationality; we

cannot protect autonomy for one who lacks it.
It is no easy matter to estimate the capacity in a person
for autonomy and relation.

The effort can only be accomplished

by communication founded in trust,
and territorial claims.

and unfettered by suspicion

The necessary information develops

through the process of loving attention, which is the painstaking
effort to understand all relevant aspects of the patient's
experience.

We shall consider this concept in more detail

65
Richard McCormick, "The Quality of Life,The Sanctity of
Life," Hastings Center Report. (February, 1978), pp.30-6.
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shortly.
In the ethics of responsibility, moral decisions require a
knowledge of context and of subjective information.
morality cannot be reduced to a system of rules.

Therefore,

Nonetheless, we

can describe standards by which we may evaluate moral decisions,
and we have listed these in the opening of this section. As our
discussion continues, we will describe how these standards may be
applied specifically to medicine.

A Member of the Community
The ethics of responsibility draws upon Gilligan's idea of
the moral decision-maker,
lives.

and the community in which he or she

The moral agent does not espouse the extreme form of

autonomy,

but sees him or herself as an integral part of a

community.
In the ethics of responsibility,

the community is more of a

sustaining environment than a means of suppressing aggression.
We will rely upon Durkheim's concept of the "collective
conscience," which is a "psychic reality" vested with moral
authority.66

Although Durkheim conceives of this entity as ideal

and unchanging,
infallible.

I prefer to redefine it as neither innate nor

It evolves over time and shifts to a degree within

segments of society,
generation,

according to ethnicity,

religion,

and degree of social privilege. The conscience is

66
Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society,
by George Simpson, New York, The Free Press, 1933, (1893),

trans.
p.78.
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meant to be seen in a positive light,
right from wrong,

as a means of determining

rather than as an instrument for meting out

censure.
Rather than highlight the autonomy of individuals,
collective conscience emphasizes our interdependence,
all contribute to its formation.

the

since we

We can incorporate this concept

into an idea of community in which members are encouraged not
just to stay out of each other's way, but to actively contribute
to the well-being of all.

In the rights model,

the community

resembles a union of states whose members select non-aggression
as their goal.

In the responsibility model,

the community is more

like an organism, which flourishes as a whole to the degree in
which each component thrives.

Responsibility is not what we owe

to persons by virtue of the rights they may demand of us,
our expression of membership within the community.

but is

This vision

of community fits well with Gilligan's idea of moral maturity.
For her, maturity is represented by one who integrates the needs
of the self and of others.

For a physician,

this would mean

striving to see clearly the needs of the patient, while not
pretending to be oneself unaffected by highly emotional
situations,

as when a patient's death is imminent.

The physician

who is thus aware of emotion is not adrift in a sea of bathos,
but does not ignore the presence of such feelings as sadness and
pity.
Gilligan's unique description of the moral agent gives rise
to a different process of moral choice.

As mentioned in chapter

■
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IV,

Kohlberg depicts moral choice as occurring in an emotional

vacuum.

Any rational being provided with the correct data would

select the correct choice.
attachment;
Gilligan,

indeed,

The operation does not require

it flourishes in the setting of detachment.

as well as other writers,

the only way,

argues that detachment is not

nor necessarily the best way,

to carry out moral

decision-making.
Iris Murdoch offers a description of moral choice which
includes the concept of love,

in the form of careful attention.

In "The Idea of Perfection," Murdoch suggests that moral
decisions need not be the result of purely rational analysis.67
Instead,
Weil,

she borrows the concept of loving attention from Simone

and shows how it may be part of certain types of moral

choice.

"Love" in this context refers nether to erotic love nor

to the love of family members for one another.
the concept of "philios," the bond of trust,
devotion typical of life-long friends.

It is closest to

loyalty,

Murdoch explains loving

attention through the example of a mother-in-law, M,
daughter-in-law,

D.

and

and her

M at first sees D as a rather immature

girl, who lacks refinement and poise.

However, M

suspects this

unfavorable judgment may be partially motivated by jealousy.
Furthermore,

she wishes to treat D with respect,

married to M's son.

since she is

Over time, M reflects upon D,

and encourages

herself to examine D's attributes carefully, yet respectfully.

67
Iris Murdoch, "The Idea of Perfection," in The
Sovereignty of Good. New York, Schocken Books, 1971.

M
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is not dishonest and does not attempt to see D as better than she
is.

She does pay careful attention to the way in which her

evaluation of D is adversely affected by emotions like jealousy;
she does not ignore emotion but looks steadfastly upon it,
acknowledging its power.

Through the process of this patient,

gradual discipline, M learns to see D more clearly,

and yet more

kindly.
In the above example, Murdoch provides us with an unusual
description of moral decision-making.

She does not present

choice as something we do all at once and dramatically.
contrary,

On the

the subtle art of seeing persons as they are is more

evident than any overt act.

Nor is it possible to extract the

choice and the persons concerned from their context; the
relations between them make an enormous difference to the
situation.
effort,
law.

Choice is the product of sustained, painstaking

as in the choice to be respectful to one's daughter-in-

Moral choice is not the calculus of abstract principles,

but a discernment of the interrelation between subjective and
objective data,

respect and need,

this sort of decision-making,

and emotion and choice.

In

attention is not a quality that can

be added, but is an integral part of what makes this choice
moral.

It is precisely this quality of loving attention which is

appropriate to the resolution of ethical dilemmas in medicine,
and yet which is prevented by an atmosphere in which the threat
of punishment looms large.

This quality of attention is

proscribed by the adversarial atmosphere encountered in court,

'
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and recommended by George Annas.

Yet it is such attention which

patients deserve from us when we attempt to care for them in
their most vulnerable moments.
What Murdoch is describing is a different type of knowledge
than the type described by Kohlberg.
rights,

Within the ethics of

all the necessary knowledge is publicly available.

This

would mean that moral choice in the real world would not be much
different from that in the Heinz dilemma.

One need only reduce

the problem to its essence and perform the moral calculus to
arrive at the right answer; any thinker would arrive at the same
right answer.

This description is reminiscent of the "choiceless

chooser" in law,
of justice.

i.e.,

However,

the judge who is a computer-like conduit
according to Gilligan and Murdoch,

some

necessary information will be missing if we rely exclusively on
this method.

Vital knowledge must be acquired by loving

attention to a specific object,

in a specific context.

On the one hand, Murdoch tells us that morality requires
attachment,

and we observe that doctors and patients do indeed

form attachments,

rather than maintain strict emotional

neutrality toward each other.

On the other hand,

not possible within the ethics of rights.

Thus,

attachment is
the rights

context seems not to fit the conditions of decision-making in a
medical context.
Gilligan's research subjects resisted the limits imposed by
hypothetical dilemmas.

They hesitated to make general

pronouncements without knowing the particularities of the
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individual's circumstances.

Subjective information,

that demanded by Gilligan's research subjects,
ethical,

emotional,

similar to

and tied to the

and personal details of the patient's needs,

is required in decisions to withhold medical treatment.
Communication is vital to the proper functioning of the
ethics of responsibility.
and complex,

The information required is subtle

and may only be discerned with the loving attention

of physician and family.
even with these,

Communication requires time and trust;

information may be so emotionally charged that

it is difficult to share.

The emphasis on rights introduces

adversarial feelings which serve to divide the decision-makers,
and prevent communication.

An emphasis on responsibility unites

them in the common goal of caring for the patient.

Learning from Dax
A patient may be drastically limited in his autonomy,

yet

may nonetheless retain an unlimited capacity to feel pain.

Such

is the situation in the film Pax's Case, which documents the
actual experiences of a severely burned young man.
mentally competent,

Although

Dax was not allowed by his mother or

physicians to refuse treatment for his burns,
would have resulted in fatal infection.

a refusal which

Dax argued that he did

not want to die, but that the physical and mental pain of
receiving and anticipating treatment was so excruciating that he
would rather die than endure it.

Those who thwarted Dax's

decision offered a number of arguments,

including that he was
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temporarily mentally incompetent because of his pain.

Dax was

treated and eventually went on to marry and run a successful
business.

Thus,

by "objective criteria"

one might argue that

Dax's pain was worthwhile because of the good outcome.
however,

Dax,

disagrees.

In the final scenes,

filmed many years after his accident,

Dax remains blind and severely limited in his physical abilities.
He insists that it would have been better to let him refuse
treatment and die,

not because of his current disabilities,

because of the pain he endured.

but

He argues compellingly that

those who elected treatment for him were unable or unwilling to
believe his statements that his pain was unendurable.
the logic of those who,

since they could not

chose to disregard it.

From the perspective of care,

He assails

fathom his pain,
Dax's

family and physicians seem to have respected neither his autonomy
nor his relationality.
a rational,
trust,

They not only denied his ability to make

independent choice,

they destroyed his sense of

and thus his sense of connection to others.

Dax's Case is a chilling reminder of the limits of
communication.

We cannot truly understand the subjective

experience of others,
burden to try.
Dax,

but we are not therefore relieved of the

This applies to the extremely articulate,

like

but no less to those whose autonomy is even more severely

compromised,

by virtue of mental

incompetence.

ignore the coherent verbal pleas of Dax,

If we are able to

how much easier is

ignore the desperate gestures of the speechless patient?

it to
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A more disturbing question is that if Dax,

with his clear

understanding of the future which might await him,
current life with pain,

rejects his

what must be the outlook of the patient

who has no grasp of the purpose of treatment,

or of its duration,

or of the possible good which it may potentiate?
When we treat patients who are severely incompetent,
ought to be very clear about what we offer them,
and not we,

who pay the price in pain.

gained is great,
the potential
treating.

When the benefit to be

However,

when treatment inflicts pain,

and when we

relief from pain,

we must reconsider the necessity for treatment.

good fortune to have a patient like Dax,
tragedy,

and with

then we feel justified in

cannot offer the patient fuller competence,
cure,

when it is they

such as a long life free from disease,

for full competence,

we

or

It is our

who survived his

to tell us of our errors and of our cruelty.

heed his admonishments all the more closely,

We must

for he stands

in the

place of so many who cannot speak.
Individual patients and families will gauge differently the
amount of pain that can be born in exchange for a hoped-for
benefit,

and we must accommodate these variations.

However,

an

extraordinary excess of suffering ensues when all patients are
treated maximally,

regardless of a vanishingly small hope for

improvement.

Goals for Treatment
If we choose goals of therapy which are respectful to
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patients'

needs and circumstances,

the task of selecting or

rejecting specific treatments will be clarified.

An effort to

determine such goals has been made in our community,
Haven Hospital

(YNHH).

at Yale New

The policy on Do Not Resuscitate

Decisions was the product of a committee appointed in 1978 by
Samuel Thier,

then Chairman of the Department of Medicine. 68

The

committee made a series of recommendations regarding the
identification and responsibilities of the attending physician,
and appropriate communications between health care providers and
families.

The committee also recommended the classification of

treatment goals

into three basic categories.

In Class A,

patients are to receive all appropriate curative interventions
and maintenance therapies:
The primary goal is to achieve arrest, remission, or cure
of the basic disease process.
The aims of curative therapy
take priority over those of functional maintenance, which in
turn hold a higher priority than those of comforting
therapy.69
Most patients,
uncertain,

including very ill ones whose diagnosis remains

will

fall

into this

first classification.

Classification B emphasizes the maintenance of function in
patients for whom a cure is thought to be unattainable,

and is

also appropriate for competent patients who decline curative
treatments.
and comfort.

The goal of maintaining function supercedes both cure
This class is further subdivided,

depending upon

68
Committee on Policy for DNR Decisions, YNHH, "Report on
Do Not Resuscitate Decisions," Connecticut Medicine. August,
1983, Vol. 47, No. 8.
69

Ibid..

p.479.
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whether the patient is to be resuscitated in the event of
cardiopulmonary arrest.
The final classification is C,
takes precedence over all others.
for whom not only a cure,

in which the goal of comfort

This goal

is suited to those

but the maintaining of physiologic

function either can no longer be attained,

or is no longer

desired.
Of the legal cases we shall discuss,
category A,

most would not be in

since the patients suffer lethal diseases

no curative treatment could be proposed.

Saikewicz

is an

exception since his doctors claimed to seek remission.
general,

disputes arose when one party,

for which

In

usually the family,

wished to treat the patient as if he or she were in class C.

The

legal cases arose from tension between the desire to cure and the
responsibility to comfort.
In general,
and this

there is a presumption in favor of treatment,

is why most patients are treated according to the goals

of class A.

However,

of patients with fatal

this presumption may not work to the good
illnesses,

for there are instances when

treatment for other purposes than comfort is not consistent with
respect.

Comfort as the Goal
The YNHH policy states that comfort is an appropriate
therapeutic goal

for one who is dying.

There are,

however,

circumstances where comfort may rightfully be emphasized for

<w
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patients with fatal diseases,

although death need not be

imminent.
Margaret Farley,

in "Obligating Features of Personhood,"

focuses on the person's capacity for relation.70

Starting with

Kant's notion that we must show respect for persons,

Farley

questions what it is about persons that is deserving of our
respect.
puts

Previous authors have focused on autonomy,

but Farley

forward relationality as equally central to personhood,

therefore equally deserving of respect.
persons because they are autonomous,
relational.

Therefore,

and

we respect

and because they are

This does not imply that we need no longer respect

persons who become incapable of relation and/or autonomy.
continue to respect and care for them.

However,

the ways

We
in which

we respect beings without autonomy or relation are different from
our ways of responding to competent,

relational persons.

We

cannot nurture autonomy and relation that no longer exist.
can strive to minimize pain and fear.
a fatal

illness,

We

The patient afflicted with

excluded by profound incompetence from both

autonomy and relation,

need not be forced to undergo painful

procedures to extend biologic life.

This stance would justify

the removal of a respirator from an irreversibly unconscious
patient,

for instance.

Richard McCormick addresses this problem in a similar
fashion by discussing the patient's potential,

specifically the

potential to participate in the life of the community.

70

Farley,

op.

cit..

p.2.

He
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states:
...life is not a value in and of itself....It is a value to
be preserved precisely as a condition for other
values...Since these values cluster around and are rooted in
human relationships, it seems to follow that life is a value
to be preserved only insofar as it contains some
potentiality for human relationships.71
Thus,

it is not life per se which has unconditional value,

the experiences which it makes possible.

but

When we are confronted

with a patient whose life holds no further potential, we must
consider gravely whether we must pursue the extension of biologic
life.

What do we offer this patient in exchange for his pain?

He cannot understand hope; he cannot understand the ratio of
benefit to burden.

The majority of such patients,

however,

continue to feel pain.
To refuse a life-sustaining treatment for an incapacitated
patient need not mean the devaluing of that patient.
an infringement of their autonomy,

it is a recognition of their

ineluctable dependence and vulnerability,
responsibility to care for them.

Rather than

and of our

As Father McCormick says:

While speaking in terms of 'every life' being of 'equal
value' reveals a legitimate concern, (that medical treatment
not be denied or withheld in a way violative of the rights
of individuals) that is not the issue.
Every person is of
equal value. But not every life....72
When Father McCormick refers to a patient whose life has no
further potential, he — like Margaret Farley — concentrates on
the relational capacity of the patient.

1974,

71
Richard McCormick,
p.175.
72

McCormick,

Among those whose with

"To Save or Let Die," JAMA.

"Quality of Life...,

ii

p. 35.
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no further potential for relation are the irreversibly
unconscious.

An emphasis on comfort would be appropriate for

these unfortunate beings,

even if death is not imminent.

Under what circumstances may patients who are neither
irreversibly unconscious nor competent be cared for with comfort
as the primary goal?

Let us imagine a person whose communication

skills are so limited that he or she is not able to understand
the purpose of a medical intervention,
and benefits.

nor its associated risks

Imagine that this person has a fatal illness,

which no curative therapy exists.

for

The therapy in question,

therefore, would necessarily be one that maintains biologic
function or extends life, but could neither cure nor cause
remission.

Such extensions of biologic life may sometimes be

considerable in duration,

as for example,

Such a person would lack autonomy,
relational capacity.

in Quinlan's case.

yet might still retain

In order to uphold the principle of respect

for persons, therefore, we would need to protect relationality,
perhaps by nurturing the patient's ability to trust.

To

administer painful and mysterious treatments to this incompetent
patient would undermine trust,

and therefore respect.

If a

therapy is known to be significantly painful or debilitating,
is legitimate to withhold such therapy.

it

An example of such a

circumstance would be the rejection of chemotherapy for Joseph
Saikewicz.
For therapies which are not generally believed to be unduly
painful, physicians in consultation with families might

.FI
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legitimately begin such treatments.

However,

should the

individual patient express — in whatever way he or she can —
that the therapy is either physically or mentally painful,
treatment may be terminated.

then

The rejection of surgery to

reimplant a gastrostomy tube for ninety-two year old Mrs. Hier is
an example in this category.

The court rejected surgery for her

not only because of the risk and pain of surgery, but also
because simply having a gastrostomy tube in place was painful to
Mrs. Hier.
The preceding argument assumes that the physician and family
have determined that comfort should be the primary goal of
therapy.

Therefore,

specific treatments are accepted or rejected

on the basis of the amount of pain they cause.

Some of these

painless treatments could conceivably also be therapies which
extend biologic life.

Thus, we have accounted only for pain

caused by medical interventions,

and not for that associated with

the patient's basic disease process,
existence.

or with his or her very

A significant number of seriously ill patients,

however, will suffer severe,
metastatic cancer.

chronic pain,

For these patients,

for instance from

once we have chosen

comfort as the therapeutic goal, we may responsibly decide not to
continue or initiate any treatment that extends biologic life,
even if the treatment itself causes no additional pain.

Thus,

the

patient's condition is such that any efforts to extend biologic
life would not be consistent with the goal of comfort.

An

example of a therapy in this category might be the addition of

r
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antibiotics to pre-existing intravenous lines,

in a patient with

an acute infection atop a chronically painful,

incurable disease.

The treatment would not in itself be painful,

except by

prolonging the patient's agonizing life.
Within this system,

there is no philosophical difference

between withholding and withdrawing therapy.

Specifically,

there

is no obligation to continue a therapy once its benefits no
longer outweigh its burdens.
are granted special status.

Furthermore,

no types of therapy

Any therapy which can inflict pain,

which includes all those dependent upon the insertion of needles
and catheters, may be terminated.
comfort,

If necessary to maximize

it is permissible to withdraw antibiotics,

blood products,

and in special circumstances,

respirators,

nutrition.

Within the ethics of responsibility, we hope to encourage care
that is consistent with respect.

For those incompetent patients

in whom significant improvement can no longer be expected,
for whom treatments cause substantial pain,

and

including fear, we

may morally decide to support comfort rather than biologic
function, by withdrawing a painful,

life-sustaining treatment.

This does not imply that we abandon the patient,
withdraw all treatment.
life-sustaining,
termination.

However,

or that we

if the painful treatment is

death may come sooner as a result of its

This result is preferable to a brief extension of

life punctuated by repeated or persistent, mystifying pain.

.
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Chapter VII: John Storar

Facts of the Case
A major goal of the ethics of responsibility is to make
decisions for incompetent patients according to principles that
are at once more clear and more kind.

We will examine the

dilemma of one seriously incapacitated patient,
decision that resulted,

discuss the legal

and then consider what alternatives might

have been preferable.
John Storar, when he came to the attention of the courts,
was a severely retarded 52 year old man.73

He had a mental age

of about 18 months. Although he was unable to speak,

he

communicated by means of grunts and gestures; he had been
institutionalized at age five at the Newark Developmental Center
in New York state.

For John,

abandonment by his family,

institutionalization had not meant

for his 77 year old mother continued

to visit him, her only child,

daily.

Notably, John was cared for

in an institutional setting by a group of physicians;

no one

doctor had primary responsibility for him.
In July,
John's urine.

1979, physicians at the facility noted blood in
After getting permission from Mrs.

Storar,

they

conducted appropriate tests and discovered cancer of the bladder.
John was treated with radiation therapy,

363

73
In the Matter of John Storar,
(1981).

to which his mother,

420 N.E.2d 64;

as

52 N.Y.2d
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his legally appointed guardian,
radiation therapy,

consented.

After six weeks of

the cancer was in remission.

John was relatively well until the following March, when his
doctors once again noted hematuria.

An unsuccessful attempt was

made to cauterize the lesions in his bladder,
stop the bleeding.

in an effort to

After the failure of this therapy,

the

physicians determined that John's cancer was "terminal," i.e.,
that he would die of it despite further medical or surgical
intervention.
By May, John had gradually lost enough blood so that his
doctors asked permission to transfuse him.
refused,

but then acquiesced.

Mrs.

Storar at first

John received transfusions

regularly until mid-June, by which point he required two units of
blood every one to two weeks.

On June 19, Mrs.

the transfusions be discontinued;
extremely unpleasant to John,
prolong his discomfort."74
transfusions were necessary,

Storar asked that

she insisted that they were

and that they served "only

[to]

His physicians claimed that the
and went to court in order to get

permission to transfuse John over the objections of his legal
guardian.
A hearing was held in September, by which time the cancer
had metastasized to John's lungs,
organs."75

and "perhaps to other

At that point, physicians estimated that John would

live another two to six months.
74

Ibid..

p.260.

75

Ibid..

p.271.

'

90

The case traversed several levels of the New York state
judicial system.

In March,

1981, The Court of Appeals handed

down what has stood as the final decision.
reversed the lower court,
correct,
course,

The Appeals Court

asserting that the physicians were

and that John should be transfused.

Although he had,

of

continued to receive blood pending the appeal, John had

died some months before this decision was announced.
In writing for the majority. Judge Wachtler based his
opinion on certain factors.

He asserted that John was

functioning at "his usual level of mental and physical activity"
with transfusions,

that they did not cause excessive pain,

and

that he therefore ought to receive blood despite his mother's
objections.

Judge Wachtler conceded,

John objected to the transfusions.

as did all parties,

that

After receiving blood, John

frequently passed large clots in his urine,

and these were

frightening to him,

as well as painful.

with approval that,

although John displayed anxiety about his

transfusions,

Judge Wachtler noted

this was treated with sedatives before the

procedure.
Judge Wachtler does not comment,
dissenting opinion,

as Judge Jones did in the

on John's increasing discomfort and hostility

during the procedure, which had recently led to the use of
physical restraints during the transfusions.

Further,

the

dissenting Judge Jones noted that although John was physically
still able to perform such activities as bathing himself,

he was
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far more withdrawn,
infrequently."76
transfusion.

and "ventured outside his room
Thus,

Judge Jones

interpretation of the

in deciding that John did not require
is swayed by his different

"facts"

did not function at his usual
while perhaps not

of the case.
level,

and that the transfusions,

"excessively" painful

far from a minor intervention.

He finds that John

in a physical

sense,

Upon closer examination,

see that more than the facts of the case are debatable;
have cause to question the neutrality of the court,

were

we shall
we shall

as well as

its very suitability for deciding such matters.

A Fair Comparison?
In considering the dilemma of John Storar and those
concerned with his care,
precedents.

The major precedents,

involving retarded adults,
infants.

Judge Wachtler naturally sought
however,

were not cases

but a series of cases

As the judge explained,

for

involving

"Mentally John Storar

was an

infant and that is the only realistic way to assess his rights
this litigation."77

in

This is a new twist on a disturbing yet

familiar theme.
The judge,

unable to fathom what ought to be done with

someone in John's unenviable situation,

reduces the complexity of

the problem by imagining John's situation to be otherwise.

His

tactic is therefore similar to that used in the Saikewicz case,

76 Ibid.,
77

Ibid..

p.280.
p.275.
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in which we are asked to imagine Saikewicz
for an instant,

as magically competent

yet expecting to return to his life of profound

retardation and life-threatening cancer.

In both instances we are

asked to turn our eyes away from the patient as he really is,
from the problem formulated as

it actually is.

In so doing,

refute the standards of the ethics of responsibility,
require us to see the individual accurately,
through the lens of loving attention.

we

which

in context,

As we shall

and

see,

and
details

specific to John Storar's dilemma are lost in this process,
substantiating the misgivings expressed by Carol Gilligan on the
use of hypothetical examples.

Certainly there

is much to be

learned by comparing any current problem with similar ones
encountered previously.

Problems arise,

however,

when one

attempts to compare dissimilar instances.
A careful examination of Storar's status reveals that he is
like an infant in one way,

but dissimilar in many other respects.

The obvious basis for the comparison is Storar's

"mental age,"

a

concept meant to indicate the retarded person's competence in a
number of basic areas,

such as speech or abstract thought.

Storar's mental age is estimated at 18 months.

We read,

that he is able to bathe himself but not to speak,
combination for a "normal"
atypical

in this regard,

18 month old child.

for mental age

an odd

Storar is not

is not meant to be taken

literally;

a severely retarded 52 year old person is not

identical,

even in mental capacity,

mental age.

however,

to a child with the same

■
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The most obvious and the saddest way in which Storar differs
from a typical toddler is,

of course,

that the limits to his

physical and mental capacity are not temporary.

Indeed,

one of

the most salient characteristics of such young children is the
speed at which they learn and change.
hard won.

John's few skills had been

It took him fifty years to acquire them;

for further development is curtailed,
retardation and his cancer.

Thus,

his potential

by both his life-long

a profound difference between

John and a healthy child is that only one has the potential
growth,

for

and the possibility of becoming competent.

Judge Wachtler ignored these differences and decided that
John was like an infant.
of

famous cases

transfusions,

He then based his opinion on a series

involving infants who required blood

i.e.,

children with erythroblastosis

were born to Jehovah's Witnesses.78

fetalis who

Infants afflicted with this

disease have red blood cells that are incompatible with those of
their mother.

When fetal cells enter the maternal circulation,

the mother's blood becomes sensitized and forms antibodies
capable of destroying the infant's blood cells.

When these

antibodies cross the placenta and enter the baby's circulation,
massive numbers of red blood cells may be destroyed,
may become severely,

perhaps fatally,

anemic.

and the baby

Infants have a

limited ability to remove the products of blood cell degradation;

78
See, for example, "Application of the President and
Directors of Georgetown College," 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
certiorari denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); and D.C.Court of Appeals
Ruling, November, 1974, regarding Janet P.
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if toxic levels accumulate,
damage.

the child can suffer severe brain

A mainstay of therapy for severe forms of the disease

is

to replace the child's damaged blood cells with ones compatible
with the antibody,
detected early,

and therefore not subject

to attack.

treatment is highly effective,

If

and indeed,

healthy adults are alive today who survived this disease

many

in

infancy.
Treatment becomes difficult,
born to Jehovah's Witnesses,
series of cases

however,

when these infants are

who object to transfusions.

involving both children with erythroblastosis

fetalis and adult Witnesses who required transfusion,

the courts

have established that a parent may refuse blood products
or herself,

In a

but not for an infant.

this distinction,

Among the reasons cited for

is that all persons ought to have an

opportunity to fulfill their potential,
competent adults.

for him

In this case,

and to become autonomous,

a child should be allowed to

grow up and choose his own religion before he is allowed to die
in keeping with its tenets.
Transfusions for John Storar,

however,

are radically

different than transfusions for an infant with erythroblastosis
fetalis.
child,

For the infants,

the transfusion is curative.

by virtue of this treatment,

to live a life which is normal
severe illness.

The

once again has the potential

in duration and unhampered by

In light of the great benefit to be gained,

the great harm to be avoided,

and

the courts have determined that the

wrong of treating a child over his parent's religious objections

.

.
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is preferable to the consequences of not treating.

In this way,

the court protects the child's capacity for autonomy.
Storar, however, will receive no equivalent benefit.
him,

transfusion is not curative, but merely palliative.

For
In

forcing upon him treatment which neither he nor his parent
desires, we are not able to do so knowing that the reward to him
will be a long healthy life.

On the contrary, he may be expected

to die within two to six months,

despite our intervention.

Neither are we preserving for him the opportunity for future
autonomy. He has never been and never will be competent.
not waiting for John Storar to grow up.
respects,

Storar is not like an infant,

Thus,

We are

in significant

and transfusion for him

means something entirely different than it does for the infant
with erythroblastosis fetalis.
the ethics of rights,

Judge Wachtler reasoned within

and so strove to protect autonomy.

However, John lacked this capacity.

By the norms of

responsibility, Judge Wachtler failed to respect John,

for he did

not respond to qualities which John had, but to ones which the
judge wished he had.

Setting the Standard
The use of the Jehovah's Witness precedent is not the only
disturbing feature of the case.

The decision for Storar was

handed down in tandem with that on Brother Fox, which we have
discussed previously

(chapter II). Judge Wachtler meant to draw a

sharp distinction between the two cases,

since he decided that

,
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termination of treatment was appropriate in the case of Brother
Fox,

but not in the case of Storar.

standard was pivotal
distinction.

The substitute judgment

for Judge Wachtler in

making the

He states that:

clear and convincing proof...is required where it is
claimed that a person, now incompetent, left instructions to
terminate life sustaining procedures when there is no hope
of recovery.79
As we have seen,
extremely rare,

Brother Fox was

position of having left

indications of his wishes.
repeatedly,

in the fortunate,

unambiguously,

discussion of moral values;

although

"clear and convincing"

He had expressed his beliefs
and in the context of a serious
and had reaffirmed his statements

shortly before his final hospitalization.

For all these reasons,

Brother Fox's case demonstrates exactly the correct circumstances
for the use of substitute judgment;
he could choose.

Brother Fox is,

we know what he would do if

of course,

unusual

in having

established while competent such a clear representation of his
beliefs.
Having determined that clear and convincing proof is
required for proxy decision-making,

Judge Wachtler then presents

us with a fascinating inconsistency in his logic.

He cites

approvingly the District Attorney's claim that any patient's
right to refuse treatment is

"entirely personal"

and may not be

exercised by a third party once the patient becomes incompetent.
Although the judge purports to agree with this dubious argument,

79
In the Matter of Philip Eichner,
opinion combined with Storar, p.267.

on behalf of Joseph Fox,
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he nonetheless allows the incompetent Brother Fox to forego
treatment.

He reconciles the contradiction by claiming that it

is really Brother Fox himself who refused treatment,
judge is just carrying out his orders.

and that the

In this interesting

fiction, we see again Burt's "choiceless chooser."

The judge

denies that it is he who decides; he is merely a functionary
carrying out the directives of a now silent, yet somehow still
autonomous agent.
responsibility,

Were he acting within the ethics of

it might be easier for him to acknowledge his

role as a decision-maker.

He would then consider the relevant

subjective data, which in this case unequivocally reveals the
meaning of the treatment,
of irreversible coma,

artificial respiration in the setting

to the patient.

This caring judge would

see that the responsible decision was to withdraw the treatment.
As it is,

Judge Wachtler shields himself from the weighty

responsibility of decision.
exists,

He invents autonomy where none

and bows before it.

Unfortunately, most people who pass from lucidity into
mental incompetence are not like Brother Fox,

and will never have

expressed their beliefs on these issues.

For them,

substitute judgment becomes problematic.

We can,

the use of

for instance,

rely on inference by examining the official views of their
religion,

if any,

knowing that an individual may or may not agree

with all the tenets of his faith.

By careful investigation,

we

may thus learn enough about some once-competent patients to make
the substitute judgment standard tenable for them.
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But what of those who have never been competent?

A man like

John Storar has never had the opportunity

to clearly and

convincingly express any reasoned opinion.

Judge Wachtler

therefore correctly hesitates to use the substitute judgment
standard for Storar.

However,

he proposes no alternative

standard which might be more suitable.
the best interest standard,

Specifically,

he ignores

which does not require that the

patient was once competent nor that he expressed his beliefs on
this

issue.
The omission of the best interest standard is telling,

it allows the judge to ignore life-long incompetence
like Storar.
formulation,

in patients

The unhappy result is that in Judge Wachtler's
there

is no means by which treatment may be

terminated for a patient like John Storar.
Annas,

for

the court "effectively deprives

'right to refuse treatment'
all circumstances."80

and

'forces'

In the words of George

incompetents of any
them to be treated under

Having been denied mental competence by a

cruel accident of Nature,

Storar is now to be denied by law the

option of foregoing treatment.

If this decision is to be taken

literally,

but every never-competent

then not only Storar,

patient in New York state must always be treated maximally.
Professor Annas attempts to limit the damage by suggesting
that we interpret the decision "narrowly,"
its

full

scope and assume,

i.e.,

that we ignore

although Judge Wachtler never says as

80
George Annas, "Help From the Dead: The Cases of Brother
Fox and John Storar," Hastings Center Report. June, 1981. p.20.
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much,

that it is meant to apply only to questions of

transfusion.81

Although this interpretation decreases the scope

of the disaster,
rational.

Why,

respirator,

it does nothing to make the decision more
if it is permissible sometimes to remove a

must we always transfuse?

question below,

We shall return to this

in the section on subjectivity.

What lesson may we derive from the history of John Storar?
We see that misfortune befalls those who are not like others.
Judge Wachtler suggests that since Storar is
be like a healthy infant.

On the other hand,

incompetent,

he must

he is an adult,

therefore must be like someone who was competent,
opportunity to express views about health care.

and

and so had the
The result of

this distorted thinking is a decision that might be appropriate
for a Jehovah's witness
Brother Fox.

infant,

or a once-competent adult,

Never does Judge Wachtler suggest a remedy for

someone who is just like John Storar.
give us

like

instructions

for his care,

Storar was not able to

and Judge Wachtler is

unwilling to accept the responsibility of deciding for him.
result is a non-decision.
treated maximally;
with care.

Patients like Storar must always be

there is no option to temper their treatment

Judge Wachtler,

reasoning in the ethics of rights,

has found a rule and applied it.
responsibility,

however,

He has

flouted the norms of

by not perceiving how subjective

information and context may undermine the validity of rules.

81

Ibid.

The
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The Realm of the Subjective
Judge Jones,

as noted previously,

dissented from the

majority and decided that Storar need not have been transfused.
His reasons for disagreeing are most interesting.
does not accept the "facts" of the case.
majority,

For one, he

As stated by the

these are that the transfusions did not cause

"excessive" pain,

and that Storar was functioning at his usual

mental and physical level.

Let us address first the question of

whether or not Storar was functioning at his usual level.
Jones,

in his dissenting summary of the facts,

Judge

notes first of all

that doctors knew Storar would die from his cancer in two to six
months.

He goes on to discuss the severe pain which metastatic

bladder cancer entails,
medication,

and notes that John was on chronic pain

for which his requirements were steadily increasing

as his disease progressed.

Furthermore,

although John had long

required extra sedation before transfusion,
episodes his discomfort had increased,

during more recent

and he had also required

physical restraints to prevent his pulling out the needle.

Judge

Jones also stressed that even when not being transfused, John had
become more withdrawn,

and "stayed far more in his room."82

Taking all these factors into consideration,

it is hard to see

how the majority of the court found John to be functioning at his
"usual" level.

They seem to have disregarded the impact of

chronic pain and chronic pain medication,
patient's increasing withdrawal,
82

Storar, p.280.

as well as the

a possible result of the
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unaccustomed use of physical restraints,

and the visitation upon

him of a repeated, bewildering and painful procedure.
How could Judge Wachtler and his colleagues have ignored the
changes in John, which Judge Jones had sensitively pointed out?
They have chosen to ignore subjective aspects of John's state,
such as his withdrawal,

and concentrate instead on the less

troubling and more objective matters of his intellectual and
physical skills.
himself,

Finding that John is still able to bathe

and that he cooperated with his nurse in lowering his

pajama bottoms before an injection,
functioning at his "usual" level.

they decide that he is
In other words, pain,

fear and

depression seem not to be important to Judge Wachtler in
assessing the patient's state; he is concerned only with
emotionally neutral "objective" measures.
Storar came to a different conclusion.

No wonder that Mrs.

In the words of Judge

Jones it was she who over John's lifetime;
had come to know and sense his wants and needs and was
acutely sensitive to his best interests,...[and] had
provided more love, personal care, and affection for John
than any other person or institution, and was closer to
feeling what John was feeling than anyone else....83
Not surprisingly, John's mother found subjective criteria to be
much more compelling than did Judge Wachtler in determining
John's level of function. Although in his dissent Judge Jones did
not find the patient's pain to be "excessive," one might argue
that there was an emotional component which heightened its
physical effect.

83

Ibid.
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We must also recall that a procedure,

or the pain associated

with it, may have a very different meaning for different
patients.

We have discussed the ways in which transfusions for

John differed from those for infants with erythroblastosis
fetalis.

We might also examine the ways in which transfusions

for a severely retarded adult are dissimilar from those for other
adults.

In general,

painful.

a transfusion for an adult is not extremely

For John, however,

the procedure was more complicated.

He had no way of understanding what was being done,

or why.

He

would simply be periodically subjected to the insertion of a
large gauge needle,

and then be required to remain relatively

immobile, without touching the needle,

for a period of time that

would seem lengthy to one with the mental age of eighteen months.
When he expressed pain, he was not released, but rather was
physically restrained.

This example reminds us that when we try

to determine the extent of pain for a particular patient during a
procedure,

it is not enough to know what most patients feel under

similar conditions.

We must try as best we can to discover what

this patient feels.

Given his extreme bewilderment,

subtle changes in his state,

and the

I would argue that John's pain was

considerably more than was conceded by the court.

Although not

in and of itself enough to require the termination of the
transfusions, pain, both mental and physical,

should have been

more significant in the majority's decision.

In the ethics of

responsibility,

such subjective information would have been

central to the debate.
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Interestingly, Judge Wachtler does not tell us whether or
not he would have decided differently if the procedure had
involved "excessive" pain.

He relegates to a footnote the

comment:
Whether the presence or absence of excessive pain would be
determinative with respect to the continuation of a life
sustaining measure need not be reached under the facts of
this case.84
From this statement we derive no clear idea of the circumstances
under which Judge Wachtler would grant relief to a suffering
patient by allowing the discontinuation of an invasive procedure.
One has the impression, however,

that such circumstances would be

rare indeed.
Judge Wachtler did not,

however,

subjective factors in his reasoning.

completely eschew
A close look at his

language reveals subtle yet significant emotional content in some
key phrases.

For instance, Wachtler tells us that:

...as one of the experts noted, transfusions are analogous
to food — they would not cure cancer, but could eliminate
the risk of death from other treatable causes.85
This statement is noteworthy in a number of ways.

The expert

quoted is a physician, but the opinion expressed is not strictly
speaking a medical one.

Instead,

it is a highly subjective

statement. Judge Wachtler seems not to have noticed this
migration from the technical to the philosophical,
the statement at face value.
84
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and accepts

Upon closer examination, we

■
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discover that the statement conceals two covert and highly
questionable assumptions.

These are,

transfusions are alike; and second,

first,

that food and

that feeding is always

obligatory.
Thus,

this physician draws in an uncritical fashion upon the

symbolic significance of food.

On a very basic level we

associate being fed with being taken care of.

For this reason,

the termination of feeding in the critically ill,
through intravenous lines and gastrostomy tubes,
controversial today.

remains

The courts have been much quicker to permit

the termination of ventilatory support,
measures considered strictly medical,
allow the termination of feeding.
have pointed out,

for instance

antibiotics and other

than they have been to

However,

as Lynn and Childress

there are circumstances in which it is ethical

to withhold food for the terminally ill,

and a number of such

cases have recently been decided in favor of termination.86
From his comments on food,

and from his decision, we must

assume not only that Judge Wachtler believes food always to be
necessary-/ but that transfusions fit into this same magical
category.

In that case,

it is not surprising he would decide

that patients must always be transfused.
Should we place transfusions in a special category,
treatments that must always be given?

as

The judge uses some

86
Joanne Lynn and James Childress, "Must Patients Always
Be Given Food and Water," Hastings Center Report. October, 1983,
pp. 17-21.
For appropriate cases, see In the Matter of Mary
Hier, 18 Mass. App 200 (1984), and In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super.
453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983).
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emotionally loaded language to reveal his opinion on the matter.
He writes of the patient

"bleeding to death,"

and suggests that

such a thing cannot be permitted because "someone,
as close as a parent or sibling,
with an incurable disease."87

feels that this

It is

even someone

is best for one

ironic that the patient was

just as dead when he died from his metastatic cancer,
received his transfusions to the last,

having

sedated and restrained.

The point is not that treatment should routinely be withheld
from fatally ill patients.

On the contrary,

we must extend

ourselves to do all we can to offer appropriate therapy for these
patients.

The problem is rather that the law is an extremely

clumsy tool.

Its processes are slow and inflexible,

which even those who advocate extensive judicial
into medical dilemmas will concede.

a point

intervention

Furthermore,

the law does

not deliver the promised benefits of objectivity.

It is blind to

some important subjective matters,

such as the meaning of a

procedure to a particular patient.

It is also unwittingly

subjective when it determines,

without analysis,

that

transfusions and food are both magically important therapies,
which may not be withheld under any circumstances.
The dissenting Judge Jones is a most eloquent spokesman when
he summarizes the flaws of the Storar decision,

and of judicial

intervention in general:
[This]...problem is one which the judicial system is
unsuited and ill-equipped to solve and which should not
usually be made the subject of judicial attention...The

87

Storar,

p.275.
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methodology and techniques of our classic adversary system
are not best suited to the resolution of the issues
presented.
The courts can claim no particular competence to
reach the difficult ultimate decision, depending as it
necessarily must not only on medical data, but on
theological tenets and perceptions of human values which
defy classification and calibration....88
Thus,

Judge Jones stands in direct opposition to George Annas on

the merits of judicial expertise.

With this recommendation,

us leave behind the legal system and its ethics of rights,

let

and

consider what benefits might have befallen John Storar had his
dilemma been considered within the ethics of responsibility.

A Responsible Solution
By reasoning within the ethics of responsibility,

we hope to

devise for John Storar a solution which is both kinder and more
clearly analyzed.
might have been,

What follows is a speculative account of what
had the ethics of responsibility predominated in

this case.
First,

we will discuss the lack of clarity which permeated

this dilemma.

Thorough communication between parties

is one

essential element of the ethics of responsibility which seems to
have been lacking.

Although we cannot know directly what efforts

were made at communication,

there is considerable indirect

evidence that these efforts were insufficient and ineffective.
Significantly,

we learn that John had not one,

physicians supervising his treatment.
footnote,

88
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but a team of

fact is revealed in a

by way of explaining why an institution and not an

Ibid..

p.277.

107

individual is named as a party in the case.

The fact that no one

person was John Storar's doctor may have had an extremely
detrimental impact on communication.

This possibility is

recognized in the YNHH guidelines, by the insistence that a
single physician be designated as the responsible party for each
patient.

In this case, we wonder who Mrs.

her questions, her fears,

Storar went to with

and her invaluable knowledge of John.

Which doctor devoted to John "loving attention," by spending time
with him,

by reflecting on his particular needs,

about him from his mother?

and by learning

What information did the doctors lose

by not establishing such relationships with the patient and his
mother?

I do not suggest that these were "bad" doctors,

but that

diffused responsibility differs from that which is primary and
personal.
What evidence do we have that communication between these
doctors and Mrs.

Storar was poor?

On an intuitive level, we

suspect that good communication decreases the number of court
cases.

Where families make clear their desires and doctors make

clear the medical possibilities,

and where both are willing to

focus on the needs of the patient more than the need to control
the situation,

it is often possible to work out solutions without

judicial intervention.

In this case, however,

there is stronger

evidence than this that communication was less than adequate.
Judge Wachtler offers the following disturbing account of Mrs.
Storar's testimony:
She admitted that no one had ever explained to her what
might happen to him if the transfusions were stopped.
She

'
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also stated that she was not 'sure' whether he might die
sooner if the blood was not replaced....89
There are various possible explanations of this supposed gap in
Mrs.

Storar's understanding of the problem.

Perhaps the

physicians did explain to Mrs.

Storar,

but did so using language

that she could not understand.

Perhaps they explained clearly,

and she repressed this unwelcome information.

Or,

she may have

become so angry that she no longer believed what the doctor's
told her.

Alternatively,

she may have known the truth,

but have

refused to baldly state to the judge that she knew her actions
might shorten her son's life.
Judge Wachtler suggests,

Finally,

it is possible that as

the doctors simply never told her what

might happen if the transfusions stopped,
felt strongly about continuing them.

and why therefore they

It is almost beyond belief,

but it is possible that these doctors went to court rather than
discuss the possibility of death in a patient with metastatic
cancer.
In fact,

it seems unlikely that Mrs.

Storar truly did not

know the trade-off that was under consideration.

Her later

statements indicate that her insistence upon John's comfort was
so great that she didn't care what might happen if the treatments
stopped.

Still, the possibility exists that this case might

never have come to court if the physicians had clearly explained
the medical options.
It would be unfair to suggest that only Mrs.

89
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lacking in information.

It was from physician testimony that

Judge Wachtler determined that John was functioning at his usual
level. Although Mrs.
disagreed,

Storar and at least one other witness

their statements about John's condition seem not to

have been clearly heard.

Perhaps assessments of such subjective

matters as depression and trust were not deemed to be important.
Unfortunately,

by excluding such subjective information, we

see that the court lost sight of the details that made this case
unique.

The judge forces on this severely ill man a solution

originally designed for healthy infants.

More disturbing,

the

decision fails to take into account the fluidity of a patient's
condition.

No limitations are imposed on the requirement to

transfuse.

There is no discussion of what options are open

should John's blood loss increase in rate,
clearly in his last few days of life.

or for when he is

The implication is that

there is never to be a time when it is acceptable to the court
that comfort should be the goal of John's therapy.
Such rigidity seems lacking in feeling in the decision for
this profoundly vulnerable man.

The goals of his treatment

should have been revised in keeping with the ethics of
responsibility.
was trying to do.

Indeed,

it appears that this is what his mother

When his first symptoms appeared,

medical team agreed on the proper course to take.
battery of diagnostic tests.

she and the

John had a

He then travelled to a separate

facility to receive his series of radiation therapy treatments.
His bladder was cauterized,

and he received transfusions over a
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six week period.

It was after all these treatments,

illness was conceded to be "terminal,"

that Mrs.

when his

Storar attempted

to shift the focus of John's treatment from cure to comfort.
saw him as dying,

She

although realizing the process might take as

long as six months,

and she wanted him to be comfortable.

The physicians seemed more concerned about what the patient
would die from.

In their view,

cancer and hematuria,
from hematuria.

his life was at risk from both

and they could make certain he did not die

They could not,

this odd formulation,

treatment becomes

treat what we can treat,
blood replacement.

however,

keep him alive.

By

its own rationale.

We

and a low hematocrit is corrected with

The larger goal of this treatment,

however,

seems not to have been clearly addressed by the physicians.
they intend to extend biological

life as long as possible,

regardless of the patient's circumstances?

Did they examine

whether such an intent was motivated by technical,
legal concerns?

Did

ethical or

To what extent did they hear and respect Mrs.

Storar's wish to shift the goal of treatment?
Our discussion of these matters must be speculative.
not know if they were ever asked,
from the decision,

let alone answered.

and the stated reasons for it,

We do

Judging

we must assume

that the court and the doctors acted in a way that they thought
would protect the patient's rights.
competent to exercise any right,

Since the patient was not

the effect was to prevent his

mother from making a choice for him that would preclude other
choices.

For healthy children,

we can by this method preserve

Ill
their right to make future choices.

For John Storar,

the result

was the brief extension of a life that was confusing and painful.

As the patient became more frightened and withdrawn,
hard to see how his rights and autonomy were strengthened.

it is
More

apparent is the disservice to his relationship to his community.
For John,

his trust and sense of security are undermined as he

approaches death.

For his mother,

for her dying son is shattered,
he asks of her.

Thus,

her sense of protectiveness

for she cannot give him the help

the effort to protect John's rights did

not make him free to enjoy his autonomy,
be.

He was,

however,

for that he could never

a member of our community,

relationships and to trust;

in this,

able to form

he was like a child.

yet we were able to destroy this trust before he died,

And

and that

is the real tragedy of John Storar's dilemma.
The patient deserves our respect no less
than for his relation to our community.

for his autonomy

The destruction of this

relation is what we hope to prevent by bringing medical decisions
into the ethics of responsibility.
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Chapter VIII:

Conclusion

We have attempted to answer two questions:
for incompetent patients are made,

and how they ought to be made.

When we investigated the first question,

we found that most

medical ethicists rely on the legal model,
emotional neutrality,

detachment,

we looked more closely,
was

inadequate.

however,

with its emphasis on

and objective information.

We uncovered a complex web of emotional,

non¬

patients and

making the pose of neutrality a false one.

Dissatisfaction with the legal model
dilemmas exists not only within medicine,
itself.

As

we discovered that this model

contractual relationships which link doctors,
families,

how decisions

Witness,

for instance,

in resolving medical
but also within the law

the criticism by judges of the

current legal standards for decision-making for incompetent
patients.
We attempted to devise a better way of deciding for these
vulnerable patients by turning away from the ethics of rights,
and toward the ethics of responsibility.

In this new framework,

we discovered a system which acknowledged that attachment is
relevant to the domain of moral choice.

The inclusion of

attachment in moral discussions radically changed recommendations
about how moral choices ought to be made.
ethics of responsibilities,
freedoms,

Thus,

within the

we do not emphasize negative

such as the freedom to be left alone,

but look rather
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to ways in which we may nurture the human capacities of members
of the community.
Within the ethics of responsibility,

our obligation to

respect other persons does not depend on autonomy alone,
on the capacity for relation.

but also

Thus, we respect persons for

whichever of these human capacities they maintain.

Respect does

not mean that autonomous and non-autonomous patients must be
treated exactly alike.

Respect requires us to discover those

goals and means of treatment which respond to the patient's
actual needs.

The human dignity of dying,

or severely ill,

incompetent patients is not protected by assaulting them with
technology,

if such interventions offer no realistic hope of cure

or remission.

We show more respect for these patients by

responding to their need for relation,

i.e.,

by providing comfort

and communication to them and to those who will be diminished by
their loss.
The ethics of responsibility provides us with standards
which will lead us to make decisions that are principled and
available for public review,

yet flexible enough to respond to

the needs and vulnerabilities of individuals.
Physicians will not be able to aid families and patients in
making such decisions if their notion of professional
responsibility focuses solely on technical expertise.

These

difficult decisions, which are an integral part of the
physician's work,

demand that we go beyond the technical and into

the realm of ethics.

It is not to our credit,

therefore,

that so
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little time is devoted to the teaching of ethics to "students" of
medicine,

regardless of their level of training.

If physicians

are dissatisfied with the way in which decisions are made for
incompetent patients,

it is not appropriate for them to blame the

courts and the legal model.
our own,

We must accept the responsibility as

and learn to make decisions which are clear, yet kind.
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